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Louis Hoffner was wrongfully convicted in 
preme Court of New York on January 16, 1941, of 
degree murder and sentenced to prison for life. On N 
vember 21, 1952, he was exonerated and released. Th~; 
New York State Legislature passed an enabling Act to per·. 
mit him to sue for false imprisonment. On June 17, 1955;i; 
~ the State Court of Claims aw~rded him $112,291.00. Judge\ 
Fred A. Young, in announcing the award, said in part: 
"How can a man be repaid who has been branded a~, 
murderer and whose one hope is an early death ta 
release him from the sentence erroneously passed on 
him? For this any award is bound to be ~ mere 
token." 
There are so many cases throughout the civilized world 
where innocent men have been convicted that it would re-
quire volumes to adequately cover them. We have selected 
the foregoing outstanding works and cases to show that 
innocen~ men are convicted and that a reviewing court has 
the obligation to examine the evidence impartially, es-
pecially in a case of circumstantial evidence, and not seek, 
as the court did in this case, to find some evidence that 
could be the basis for a jury verdict and because a verdict .~ 
was returned by the jury, to dismiss the appeal. 
( 
fespectfully submitted, 
w ILLIAM J. CORRIGAN' 
ARTHUR E. PETERSILGE, 
FRED w. GARMONE, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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APPENDIX A . 
. otion for Leave to Appeal from Judgment of the Court 
of Appeals Affirming Judgment on Verdict. 
No. _________ _ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
APPEAL FROM 
THE CouRT OF APPEALS OF CuYAHOGA CouNTY. 
STATE OF OHIO, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO APPEAL IN A 
FELONY CASE. 
Appellant respectfully moves this Honorable Court 
~for leave to appeal to this Court from a judgment of the 
~Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County rendered on July 
,'i 20, 1955, wherein a judgment of the Court of Common 
' Pleas convicting Appellant of a felony was affirmed. 
Said Court of Appeals and Court of Common Pleas 
committed error prejudicial to this Appellant in the re-
spects set forth in the Assignments of Error and Brief to be 
filed in this case. 
Questions of public and great general interest are also 
·involved. 
t 
2a 
Appellant has also filed appeal herein on 
tional grounds. 
CORRIGAN, McMAHON & CORRIGAN, 
BY WILLIAM J. CORRIGAN, 
Of Counsel, 
ARTHUR E. PETERSILGE, 
FRED W. GARMONE, 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant. 
Notice. 
To the Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County: 
The Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County is 
hereby notified that this Motion will be filed in the Su-
preme Court on Monday, August 8, 1955, and at the same 
time the Appellant will request an extension of 'time for the 
filing of the Assignments of Error and the Brief in this 
case. 
WILLIAM J. CORRIGAN, 
Of Counsel for Defendant-Appellant. 
Acknowledgment of Service. 
The Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga County here-
by acknowledges service of the foregoing Notice this 5th 
day of August, 1955. 
4 
FnANK T. CuLLITAN, 
J>rosecuting Attorney-Cuyahoga 
County. 
3a 
lt' APPENDIX B. 
.Motion for Leave to Appeal from Judgment of the Court 
t of Appeals Affirming Order Denying New Trial on 
. · the Ground of Newly Discovered Evidence. 
No. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
APPEAL FROM 
THE CouRT oF APPEALS oF CUYAHOGA CouNTY. 
STATE OF OHIO, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN A 
FELONY CASE. 
Appellant respectfully moves this Honorable Court 
for leave to appeal in this case from a judgment of the 
Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County rendered on July 
25, 1955, wherein a judgment of the Common Pleas Court 
overruling Appellant's Motion for a new trial on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence was affirmed. 
Said Court of Appeals and Court of Common Pleas 
committed error prejudicial to this Appellant in the re-
spects set forth in the Assignments of Error and Brief to 
be filed in this case. 
( 
4a 
Questions of public and great general interest are also 
involved. 
Appellant has also filed appeal herein on constitu-" 
tional grounds. 
CORRIGAN, McMAHON & CORRIGAN, 
BY WILLIAM J. CORRIGAN, 
Of Counsel, 
ARTHUR E. PETERSILGE, 
FRED w. GARMONE, 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant. 
Notice. 
To the Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County: 
The Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga ~ounty is 
hereby notified that this Motion will be filed in the Su-
preme Court on Monday, August 8, 1955, and at the same 
time the Appellant will request an extension of time for 
the filing of the Assignments of Error and the Brief in this 
case. 
WILLIAM J. CORRIGAN, 
Of Counsel for Defendant-Appellant. 
Acknowledgment of Service. 
The Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga County here-
by acknowledges service of the foregoing Notice this 5th 
day of August, 1955. 
• 
FRANK T. CuLLITAN, 
Prosecuting Attorney-Cuyahoga 
County. 
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APPENDIX C. 
Opinion of the Court of Appeals on Appeal from 
Judgment on Verdict. 
No. 23,400. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 
CuY AHOGA CouNTY, EIGHTH DISTRICT. 
SKEEL, J.: 
STATE OF OHIO, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
OPINION. 
July 13, 1955. 
This appeal comes to this Court on questions of law, 
from a judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga 
County, entered on a verdict of a jury finding the defend-
ant guilty of murder in the second degree. 
The defendant was indicted by the Grand Jury of 
Cuyahoga County for the crime of murder in the first de-
gree, it being charged that on the 4th day of July, 1954, he 
purposely and of deliberate and premeditated malice killed 
Marilyn Reese Sheppard. Marilyn Reese Sheppard who 
was the wife of defendant, was found to have been mur-
dered while in bed at her residence at 28924 West Lake 
Road, Bay Village, Ohio. The report of her death was 
first made by the defendant in a telephone call to the 
t 
6a 
Mayor of Bay Village, J. Spencer Houk, a close friend of i 
the defendant and the deceased, shortly before 6 A.M. i 
July 4, 1954. Thereafter t'he police and firemen of Bay 
Village, members of the homicide squad of the Police De-
partment of the City of Cleveland, deputy sheriffs from 
the Sheriff's office of Cuyahoga County and the County 
Coroner and members of his staff, were called to the de-
fendant's home and an examination of the premises was 
conducted. The defendant was removed to Bay View Hos-
pital, where he was questioned by the coroner, a deputy 
sheriff and a police officer, and at some time thfreafter 
made a written statement of the defendant's knowledge 
and circumstances surrounding the death of defendant's 
wife. 
From the first time notice of the death of Marilyn 
Sheppard came to the attention of the press, radio and 
television stations, they immediately began to devote a 
I 
great amount of space in publicizing every conceivable 
phase of the case. Every step of the way, the announce-
ment of the death of Marilyn Reese Sheppard by force 
:md violence, the investigation of the crime, the inquest, 
the indictment and every step of the trial was headlined 
and on many occasions editorial comment was indulged in. 
The trial was protract'd over a period from October 
18th to December 17, 1954. The jury deliberated on its 
verdict from Dec. 17th to Dec. 21, 1954, including Dec. 
19th which was a Sunday. The jury, consisting of seven 
men and five women, were quartered in the Carter Hotel 
of Cleveland, Ohio, under the care of two male bailiffs 
during their deliberations. 
Before the trial began on October 17, 1954, the de-
fend. filed a motion for a change of venue, which motion 
7a 
.'Was renewed from time to time before and during the trial. 
'The defendant also moved to continue the case on the 
~ i ground that there had been so much publicity that a fair 
''trial could not be had. These motions were overruled and 
the trial had, resulting in a verdict of not guilty of murder 
hn the first degree, but guilty of murder in the second de-
gree. After overruling defendant's motion for new trial, 
i the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment as pro-
.t ··~ vided by law. 
The defendant claims the following errors: 
"l. The Court erred in denying the defendant-
appellant's application for bail. 
2. The Court erred in denying the defendant-
appellant's motion for a change of venue, which mo-
tion was repeated from time to time during the prog-
ress of the trial and repeatedly overruled. 
3. The Court erred in denying defendant-appel-
lant's application for a continuance, which was re-
peated during the progress of the trial and repeatedly 
overruled. 
4. The Court erred in compelling the defendant-
appellant to exercise peremptory challenges when the 
Court should have allowed the challenge for cause. 
5. The Court erred in denying defendant-appel-
lant's motions for withdrawal of a juror and continua-
tion of the case. 
6. The irregularities occurring during the trial 
and which reoccurred from time to time and to which 
the defendant-appellant objected and which objections 
were repeatedly overruled. 
7. The Court erred in the dismissal from the jury, 
after the jury was accepted and sworn, of Juror Wil-
liam Manning, and substituting in his place, over the 
• 
Sa 
objection of the defendant-appellant, Juror Jack 
son. 
8. The Court erred in not permitting the defe 
ant-appellant to exercise a peremptory challenge a 
such substitution. 
9. There was irregularity in the proceedings 01· 
the court. ' 
I ~ 
)., 10. There was irregularity in the proceedings of.' 
the jury. '~ 
II. There was irregularity on the part of 
prosecuting attorney. 
12. There was irregularity on the 
nesses for the State of Ohio. 
13. There was error in the orders of the court; 
by which the defendant-appellant was denied the~ 
benefit afforded him by the Constitution of Ohio and ~ 
the Constitution of the United States of America, in-· 
eluding the amendments thereto. 
1 
14. There was abuse of discretion by the Court, 
by reason of which the defendant-appellant was pre-
vented from having a fair trial. 
15. There was misconduct on the part of the 
prosecuting attorney. 
16. There was misconduct on the part of wit-
IH'sscs for the Stat(• of Ohio. 
17. The verdict is .dot sustained by sufficient evi-dence. 
18. The verdict is contrary to law. 
19. Errors of law occurring at the trial, preju-
dicial to the defendant-appellant. 
20. Evidence prejudicial to the defendant-appel-
lant was admitted over his objection. 
21. Evidence excluded from the consideration of 
th( · ·ry which was proffered by the defendant-appel-
9a 
· lant and which should have been admitted in evi-
dence. 
22. There were errors by the court in its charge 
to the jury which were prejudicial to the defendant-
appellant. 
23. There were errors by the court in refusing to 
give special instructions to the jury prior to argument, 
as requested by the defendant-appellant, and which 
were afterwards not included in his general charge. 
24. There was error by the court in overruling 
the defendant-appellant's motion for a directed ver-
dict of "not guilty" at the close of the State's evidence 
in chief. 
25. There was error by the Court in overruling 
the defendant-appellant's motion for a directed ver-
dict of "not guilty" at the close of all the evidence. 
26. There was error by the Court in denying the 
motions made by the defendant-appellant both at the 
close of the State's case and at the close of the defend-
ant-appellant's case. 
27. There was error by the Court in not remov-
ing from the consideration of the jury the count of 
first degree murder. 
28. There was error by the Court in not remov-
ing from the consideration of the jury the count of 
second degree murder. 
29. There was error by the Court in not removing 
from the consideration of the jury the count of man-
slaughter. 
30. Other errors apparent on the face of the 
record to the prejudice of the defendant-appellant, 
and by reason of which he was prevented from having 
a fair trial, as affirmatively appears from the record. 
31. The indictment by the Grand Jury was the 
result of pressure exerted on the Grand Jury. ( 
lOa 
32. The concept of presumption of innocence' 
established in the law was disregarded by the j 
who in their deliberations substituted for it a 
sumption of guilt. 
33. That the judge in this case several days 
fore the day of the trial met with newspaper report, 
newspaper photographers, television personnel 
radio commentators a~d arranged the courtroom ·· 
such a manner that the representatives of the pr 
radio and television were given preference to . 
space in the courtroom. He also caused to be b .-·• 
and erected inside the bar a long table, which ex .. 
tended across the courtroom, and apprml:imately 
twenty newspaper reporters were assigned seats at' 
this table. One end of the table was within three feet 
of the jury box. Outside the bar there are four rows: 
of benches which are for the use of the public during~ 
~ trials. Each of these benches will seat about twenty 
persons. The Court assigned the first three rows to 
the personnel of the press, radio and television and in .. 
advance of the trial caused printed slips to be made·~ 
with the names of such personnel printed thereon, j 
and said printed slips were pasted at regular intervals, 
along said row of benches so that said personnel re-" 
£erred to would know which place was assigned to 
him or her. The last row was reserved for members· 
of the defendant's family and members of the family 
of the deceased Maril~n Sheppard. The Court es- t~ 
tablished a rule that the admission of other persons ;i 
to the courtroom was to be by card. The Court also 
assigned to said newspaper, radio nnd television per- ;< 
sonnel all the rooms on the courthouse floor, includ- . 
ing the Assignment Room, where cases are assigned 'J 
to other court rooms for trial. In these rooms said j 
radio, television and newspaper personnel had private ,. 
telnnhone lines installed and other necessary equip-( 
lla 
ment to carry on their work. Space in the Assignment 
Room was set over for the Chicago Tribune, Chicago 
Sun, The New York Herald Tribune, the Akron Bea-
con Journal, The New York Journal American, The 
Associated Press, The Pittsburgh Post Dispatch, the 
New York Post, The New York Daily News, The 
International News Service and the United Press. 
There was also erected in that room special tele-
phone booths and telegraph equipment which was 
used to forward with dispatch the reports of the trial. 
Rooms were also assigned to radio commentators 
on the third floor of the courthouse. This is the floor 
on which the jury deliberating rooms are located. 
One such room located next door to the jury that 
was impanelled in this case, was used by Radio Sta-
tion WSRS and broadcasting continued from that 
room throughout the trial and during the time that 
the jury was in the room next door and during recess 
and during the deliberation of the jury. 
During the entire time of the trial a great number 
of photographers, both television and newspaper, 
stood on the steps of the courthouse, on the stairs that 
lead from the ground floor of the courthouse to the 
second floor and along the corridor on the second floor 
from the top of the stairs to the entrance of the court 
room. When the members of the jury came to court, 
when they arrived for lunch or retired at the end of 
the trial day, they passed along the way above out-
lined and were photographed and televised many 
times, all with the knowledge of the Court. 
On a number of occasions, it was necessary for 
counsel to confer privately with the court in cham-
bers on points that were in issue in the trial. On such 
occasions when said conferences were held behind the 
closed door of the judge's chamber, there would be a 
great rush of photographers, reporters, radio and tele-
( 
'1 j 
:1 
l 
l j 
1 
l 
: 
l 
i 
I 
:j 
l 
l 
l 
;] 
i 
( 
12a 
v1s10n personnel into the room which adjoined 
judge's chambers. So great was the number 
crowded into the room that it was necessary on su 
occasions for coun~el to push their way out so 
• they could again regain their place in the courtroo 
After counsel had secured their exit, then a grea1 
number of such persons as described would cro, 
into the judge's chaJillber to inquire as to the purp 
of the meeting. 
Each morning the defendant-appellant w, 
brought into the courtroom approximately ten 
utes before the trial opened, at which time he w, 
surrounded by photographers and television operators; 
and was photographed and televised many times. '!~ 
Many times during the trial there was constan~ 
moving in the part of the courtroom occupied by said~ 
reporters, radio and television personnel. They kep(: 
going in and out and changing places and relieving, 
one another. · · 
Pictures of the jurors were printed in the new~'; 
1papers and were shown on television in the evening.~ 
<\', 
Newspaper pictures were taken in the home of one/, 
juror by a Cleveland Press photographer and printed' 
in that paper along with an account of how the:. 
·' juror's family fared while the juror was in court.) 
The fact was called to the attention of the court but 
no action was taken. . 
The Court perritted p.hotographers t~ come into' 
the courtroom and take pictures of the ]Ury panel 
The court permitted photographers to go into the juey, 
room and take individual pictures of the members of, 
the jury. These pictures were printed in the news/ 
i..:;, 
papers. · 
Television cameras were set up inside the court-
house with the knowledge and consent of the court.' 
During the trial the Court was part of a television' 
13a 
. ' program that took place on the steps of the courthouse 
·· ·in the morning at a time when the jurors were ar-
riving. This program was arranged by a reporter 
named Fabian, a representative of the Scripps-Howard 
.. 
,. newspapers. The Court stood across the street and 
~ watched until he received a signal and then walked 
over to the Courthouse steps, mounted the steps and 
had a conversation with said Fabian while the tele-
.,,. 
· vision cameras operated. 
On one day while the jury was leaving the court-
house, a man appeared on the courthouse steps carry-
;:· ing a sign referring to the case of Sam H. Sheppard. I Counsel for the defendant-appellant took this man 
.. r and the sign before the Court and requested that he 
·be charged with contempt. Several days later when 
counsel was not present, this person was released. 
For months prior to the trial, news in the Cleve-
land newspapers were slanted against the defendant. 
A front page editorial appeared in the Cleveland 
Press demanding his arrest and urged he be subjected 
to the third degree. Day after day the public and 
jurors were treated to opinion-shaping headlines, 
such as "Quit Stalling and Bring Him In"-"Sam 
Declined July 4th Lie Test"-"Says Dr. Sam Talked 
Divorce." - "Testifies Sam Changed Stories" -
"Charges Sam Faked Injuries"-"Says Marilyn 
Called Sam a Jekyll-Hyde." 
Statements were made by the Chief of Police, 
Inspector of Detectives, Head of the Homicide Squad, 
'"'' members of the Prosecuting Attorney's office, which 
were adverse and condemnatory of the defendant. 
Affiant says that none of said persons testified in the 
case. 
The defendant in his testimony stated facts bear-
ing upon his questioning by Cleveland detectives. 
That evening the following headline appeared in the ( 
l 
1 
l 
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Cleveland News: "Kerr Called Dr. Sam a Bare F1 1 
Liar." The "Kerr" referred to is Captain David 
head of the Cleveland Homicide Squad. Again, 
says that said Kerr did not testify in this case. 
The jurors in their voir dire examination te 
they read Cleveland newspapers and most of 
had a Cleveland newspaper delivered into 
homes. 
The jurors received the case at 10: 30 A.M. 
day, December 17th and deliberated until 4: 30 P 
Tuesday, December 21st. This included deliberatio( 
on Sunday, December 19th, from approxima -
10: 30 A.M. to 6: 00 P.M. •' 
During the deliberations the jury Jras orde 
sequestered and placed in charge of two male offi, 
of the court. During the period of deliberation, 
jurors were taken by the officers to their meals an( 
at night were lodged in the Carter Hotel. During ·. 
time the jury was allowed to separate and no femaJe 
·~ 
officer of the court was appointed to supervise the 
1 female members of the jury. 
On one occasion the jury was separated 
photographs taken of such separated groups. One, 
photograph was taken of the women members of th~., 
jury in one group and another photograph showed 
the male members of the jury in another group. Thi! 
photographs of the groups as separated were printed',, 
. ~ 
in the newspaper~, and in order to arrange sm# 
groupings, communications were made with the juryl 
Other photographs were taken of the jury while at; 
their meals, coming to the courthouse and leaving the~ 
courthouse. ..-
That during the five days of deliberation and1 
during deliberations the jury was in a room that waa 
one flight of about twenty stairs from the courtroom;: 
that the door from the court room to this flight of/ 
stairs was generally open; that during the delibera,; 
15a 
tions the court room and the corridor outside was 
filled with curious onlookers, reporters, television, 
1 radio commentators and photographers. During this 
time card games were in progress in the courtroom, 
groups were visiting, a great number of people milled 
-. · inside and outside of the court room, and the court 
room and corridors resounded with laughter, loud 
talk and noises. The floors of the court room and 
corridor became stained and dirty, and strewn about 
with papers, cigarette butts, empty paper cups and 
various litter; that the atmosphere that existed dur-
ing the trial and during the deliberation of the jury 
l.'i' ' was not conducive to profound and undisturbed de-
liberations. 
34. The court erred in overruling the request of 
juror Eleanor Borke to put a question to the defend-
ant appellant. 
35. The jury consisted of seven men and five 
women. When the case was submitted to the jury the 
Court appointed two male bailiffs but no female bail-
iff, and after the commencement of deliberations the 
· jury separated at night and the female members of 
the jury were not in charge of a female bailiff and 
were not supervised by an officer of the court; that at 
, the hotel where the jury was quartered, the members 
of the jury had free access to telephone and did com-
municate during such time by telephone to various 
individuals. 
36. The defendant appellant was deprived of his 
liberty without due process of law and was denied 
trial by an impartial jury by reason of the widespread 
publicity and misinformation disseminated thorugh 
the newspapers, radio and television stations, both 
·; •. before and during the trial; that during the trial the 
· jury was subjected to opinion-forming headlines and 
editorials, with resultant mass hysteria and the crea-
\ 
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tion of an atmosphere of public opinion which made 
a fair and impartial trial by jury impossible, all withlli, 
the knowledge of the court and all contrary to the 
provisions of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States of 
America and contrary to the provisions of Article I,:, 
Section 10 of the Con~titution of the State of Ohio. 'l 
37. There was error by the court in overruling 
the motion by the defendant appellant for a new 
trial." 
The first claim of error based on the failure of the 
,, 
court to admit the defendant to bail must be olrerruled. 
This was a question resting in the exercise of the sound 
discretion of the trial court. The evidence produced at the···. 
hearing of defendant's request for bail has not been t 
brought into the record before us. In any event, su~h 
ruling cannot now be raised after trial and conviction. 
The second, third, sixth, ninth, tenth, thirtieth, thirty-
first, thirty-third and thirty-sixth claims of error are con-
cerned with denying defendant's motion for change of 
venue and continuance, because of the manner in which 
the case was publicized. The record shows that the case, 
from the date of Marilyn Sheppard's death, until after the 
verdict was returned and the motions for new trial were 
filed and heard, received lmusual coverage by the press, 
radio and television. No case in this community ever 
attracted such public interest or received so much atten-
tion by news disseminating agencies. Some of such pub-
licity unquestionably was intended to spur on the investi-
gation and was highly critical of the defendant and went 
so far in some instances as to have been designated by , 
other newspapers as an attempt to try the case in the ' ( 
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public press before he was indicted. All of this is argued 
';~Y the defendant as establishing that the court committed 
.: an abuse of discretion in refusing to continue the case to 
''a later date or to order a change of venue. 
.. The legal questions presented by these assignments of 
error are not to be decided by a consideration of the pub-
1r< } licity and the tendencies it might have in influencing the 
·• public mind generally with regard to their judgment of 
whether the defendant was guilty of the crime charged 
against him. The legal question is whether or not the de-
; fendant would be accorded a fair, constitutional trial by 
an impartial jury who would decide the issues of fact en-
tirely by considering only the evidence submitted to them 
in open court, without the slightest outside influence, when 
,, considered in the light of the law as given them by the 
court. The best test as to whether or not a fair and impar-
tial jury can be secured is the examination of jurors sum-
moned as provided by law, on the voir dire examination. 
In the case of Townsend vs. State, 17 C. C. (N. S.) 
380, the court said: 
"The examination of jurors on their voir dire affords 
the best test as to whether or not prejudice exists in 
the community against the defendant; and where it 
appears that the opinions as to the guilt of the defend-
ant of those called for examination for jurors are 
based on newspaper articles and that the opinions as 
formed are not fixed but would yield readily to evi-
dence, it is not error to overrule an application for a 
change of venue." (affirmed 88 0. S. 584 without 
opinion). 
In the case of Hawkins v. State, 27 Oh. App. 297, the 
indictment was for a violation of the Crabbe Act. The 
4 
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plaintiff in error had attempted to organize the citizens of 
Lorain Cou11 ty against certain public officials of th~' 
county, calling for a special grand jury to investigate the', 
killing of an insane citizen by a public official. While en~~ 
~ gaged in such activities, the plaintiff in error was indicted,,~' 
under the Crabbe Act, resulting in a great deal of news-'. ;. 
paper comment both for and against him by the news· , 
papers and also some members of the public. During the j 
impanelling of the jury, five veniremen were excused for 
cause after statements that they had fixed opinions regard-
ing the guilt or innocence of the plaintiff in error that 
would require evidence to remove. The trial cotirt over-
ruled plaintiff in error's motion for change of venue. The 
court held: 
t 
"1. Unless it be shown that a fair and impartial 
trial cannot be had in the county where an indictment 
originates, a criminal trial must be tried there. 
2. The accused of crime has a right to fair and 
impartial trial, and, if impartial jury cannot be im-
panelled in county in which indictment was found, 
trial court must grant motion for change of venue. 
3. Whether or not an order granting change of 
venue in a criminal case should be made rests largely 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
4. Appellate coprt should not disturb trial 
court's ruling on motion for change of venue in 
criminal case unless it be clearly shown that trial 
court has abused its discretion. 
5. Denying change of venue for local prejudice 
of trial for transporting liquor in violating of Crabbe 
Act (Sec. 6212-13 to 6212-20 G. C.) held not abuse of 
discretion, notwithstanding that affidavits filed in 
support of the motion alleged that the defendant had 
19a 
been criticized and denounced for activities in cir-
culating petitions calling for the removal of certain 
county officials from office and upon occasions of 
previous arrests on various criminal charges." 
In the case of Richards v. State, 43 Oh. App. 212 the 
"2. That trial court denied change of venue with-
out prejudice until it could be determined whether 
fair and impartial jury could be impanelled, held not 
abuse of discretion. (Sec. 13427-1 G. C.; 113 0. L. 
132, Art. I, Sec. 10 Constitution)." 
Other Ohio authorities are: 
12 Ohio Juris. Sec. 97, p. 128; 
12 Ohio Juris. Sec. 853, p. 844; 
State vs. Stemen, 90 Oh. App. 309; 
Dorger vs. State, 40 Oh. App. 415; 
Johnson vs. State, 6 0. L. Abst. 707; 
State vs. Deem, 154 0. S. 576. 
From the foregoing authorities, the law of Ohio is 
clear that the best test of whether a defendant can have a 
constitutional trial in the county in which the indictment 
is returned is to be determined upon the impanelling of 
the jury. Citizens summons for jury service represent a 
cross section of the community. Their answers to ques-
tions directed to them in the process of impanelling a jury, 
gives a clear cut picture of their state of mind; their an-
swers indicating whether or not they will be guided by 
the evidence alone in reaching conclusions of fact, must 
be given great weight in considering the question pre-
sented by a motion for change of venue. When the great 
majority of the prospective jurors called or summons as 
( 
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provided by law to be impanelled in a criminal case sta 
they are not and will not b~ subject to outside influence 
accepted on the jury, a trial judge who overrules a motio: 
' ~J 
~. 
for change of venue under such circumstances is not guil · 
of an abuse of discretion. The very foundation of the j~ 
system is founded upon the inherent honesty of our citi~ 
zens in performing courage~usly such public service with-' 
out fear or favor. , 
The law of Ohio on this subject is in complete accordi 
with the great weight of authority as shown by the 
opinions of a great majority of the courts of last rer5ort. 
In the case of Viereck vs. U. S., 130 Fed. 2d. 945, · 
which was a prosecution for violation of the "Propaganda 
Agency Act" where a change of venue was asked because 
widespread newspaper stories had aroused the community 
against the defendant, the court held that the overruling 
of suchi motion did not constitute an abuse of discretion 
where the record revealed that the jury was chosen very '' 
carefully and both sides accepted the jury which was 
eventually sworn. 
'i In the case of People vs. Broady, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 864, .f 
I 
which was a wire-tapping prosecution, the court held that ' 
newspaper comment alone, even though extensive, does , 
not establish that a defendant cannot be afforded a fair ',~ 
tri;1l in the county where the irnlictmc11t was returned and 
overruling request for change of venue did not constitute 
prejudicial error. 
Likewise, in the case of People vs. Sandgren, 75 
N. Y. S. 2d 753, the defendant was charged with second 
degree manslaughter resulting from the killing of an 
eleven year old boy by defendant's dogs wherein it was 
( 
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arged that defendant permitted such dogs to run at large 
. otwithstanding their dangerous propensities of which 
.efendant had full knowledge. In this case there was 
:~tensive newspaper coverage including direct declara-
,_tions of defendant's guilt and that he knowingly kept 
savage, vicious killer dogs. The court, in overruling a 
'motion for change of venue held that widespread publica-
,tion of belief or opinion by the press, of defendant's guilt, 
~,does not show serious doubt whether defendant will re-
ceive a fair trial so as to warrant change of venue since 
the press is entitled to public news with fair comment. 
See also: 
People vs. Connors, 251 Mich. 99; 
People vs. Swift, 172 Mich. 473; 
People vs. Broady, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 864; 
State vs. Burns, 84 A. 2d 801 (Rhode Island); 
State vs. Cooper, 92 A. 2d 786 (New Jersey); 
Jones vs. State, 240 S. W. 2d 771 (Texas); 
People vs. Walker, 246 Pac. 2d 1009 (Calif.); 
Wininger vs. State, 257 Pac. 2d 526 (Okla.); 
Wetzel vs. State, 76 So. 2d 188; 
State vs. Loveless, 80 S. E. 2d 442 (W. Va.); 
Terrance vs. Commonwealth, 265 S. W. 2d 40 
(Ky.); 
State vs. Williams, G2 N. W. 2d 742 (Iowa 1954); 
State vs. Godwin, 3 S. E. 2d 347 (216 N. C. 49) 
(N. C. 1950). 
In the case of State vs. Bird, 198 Pac. 2d 978 (Wash.) 
t the Supreme Court affirmed the overruling of a motion for 
~- change of venue in a homicide case where there had been 
i many newspaper accounts, the crime being one of great 
~ 
, .. 
1 
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'· 
brutality and held that a denial of such motion based J; 
\_,. 
claimed local prejudice, was not error in the absence 
a showing that a situation had been created which wo 
prevent defendant from receiving a fair trial before 
impartial jury. It was likewise held in the case of Terra 
vs. Commonwealth, 265 S. W. 2d 40 (Ky.) that a defendan• 
in a homicide case was not prejudiced by the denial of ~I 
motion for change of venue and it was not an abuse of 
discretion to overrule such motion despite newspaper and' 
radio publicity in a county of approximately 500,000 pe<>':'. 
pie, where there was a large reservoir of qualified jurors: 
Also, the Supreme Court of Georgia in the case of Morgan~ 
vs. State, 84 S. E. 2d 365, 211 Ga. 172, in which defendant 
had been charged with murder, it was shown that news-
papers had carried news items and editorial comment to 
the effect that defendant had confessed the crime for 
which he had been indicted and also articles had been 
published about the defendant of an inflammatory nature. 
It was held that such facts were not sufficient in them-
selves to establish that a fair and impartial trial could not 
be had in the county in which such newspapers were pub-
lished in the absence of further allegations and proof that 
jurors who had been summoned to try the case had read 
the articles and publicity and had formed fixed opinions as 
to the guilt or innocence from such newspaper articles. 
As shown by the foregoing authorities, a refusal to 
continue a case because of adverse publicity, is to be 
decided by the same rules as are applicable in considering 
a motion for change of venue. Snook vs. State, 34 0. App. 
60. Anno. Delaney vs. U. S., 39 A. L. R. 2d 1314 para. 4 
page 1321. 
t 
' 
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The record in this case discloses that a special venire 
called for the trial of this defendant as provided by 
. 2945.18 R. C. Seventy-five names were drawn from 
~e jury box. Of this number eleven were immediately 
', cused for justifiable reasons or were not found, and 
uld not be summoned (three in number) by the sheriff. 
the remaining sixty-four, thirteen were excused be-
use they had formed a firm opinion as to the guilt or in-
rtlocence of the accused and ten were likewise excused 
cause they were opposed to capital punishment. Six-
1een others were excused for cause. 
The State used four peremptory challenges and the 
defendant five. As is provided by Sec. 2945.21 the State in 
; a homicide case where there is but one defendant, is en-
titled to six such peremptory challenges and the defendant 
n 
,. a like number so that when· the jury was sworn the de-
~ fendant left the right to one peremptory challenge unused. 
·~ From the foregoing analysis of the venire of 7 5 electors 
i ~lled in this case, four of those called were not needed in 
~ empanelling a jury of twelve. Such jury was selected as 
,, ~ provided by law and sworn and accepted by the defend-
$. ant to well and truly try and true deliverance make be-
< tween the State and the defendant. 
The parties agreed to select two alternate jurors as 
provided by Sec. 2313.37 R. C. The four remaining jurors 
' of the original list, together with an additional venire of 
24 summoned as provided by law, were used for this pur-
pose. Of the 24 summoned, eight were called and ques-
1~ tioned together with the four from the original venire, in 
':1 impanelling the two alternate jurors. Of those examined, 
X three were excused for holding a firm opinion of the guilt 
t 
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or innocence of the accused, four were excused as bei 
against capital punishment, one was excused on chall~ 
for cause and each side used one peremptory challe :· 
(Each side had the right to excuse two prospective al ' 
nate jurors peremptorily under the provisions of 
2313.37 R. C.) 
The analysis of the empanelling of the jury in 
case where but sixteen prospective jurors out of 72 
amined could not sit because they had prejudged the g , 
or innocence of the accused, clearly shows that there wad! 
no difficulty whatever in impanelling a fair and impartiaf! ·l jury. ~ 
The jury having been impanelled as provided by law~: 
and sworn to afford the defendant a fair and imparti~ '' 
trinl, and to come to its verdict by a consideration of the ; 
evidence submitted in open court without any 1outside in- ;; 
flucnce or consider8tion, and where there is no claim of · 
misconduct on the part of any member of such jury dur- · 
ing the tri8l, there can be no ground to claim a mistrial 
because of continued publicity, publicizing the events of 
the trial, and other related matters. 
Claims of error Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 31, 33 and '" 
36 are therefore overruled. 
The defendant has grouped assignments of error num-
bers 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 14 under the general topic of 
"Errors in impanelling the Jury." 
The first complaint of the defendant has to do with the 
court sustaining objections of the state to questions pro-
pounded to a prospective juror (Ver linger) concerning 
what effect the defendant's affairs with other women would 
have on him, that is "would that prejudice you against 
( 
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, or create in you a sense of ill-will toward him so that 
would disregard the proof necessary to convict him of 
degree murder?" The evident purpose of this ques-
1 
'in was to find out what effect evidence of extra-marital 
'vities of the defendant, if shown, would have on the 
or's consideration of other evidence. In the form in 
.'hich the question was asked, it was objectionable in that 
asked the juror what his conclusions would be upon con-
'dering such testimony. The question as framed was very 
ifficult to understand. The meaning ascribed to the ques-
'~on by the defendant in argument would have been 
"proper. After the objection was sustained the defendant 
'. reframed the question and the court, over the objection of 
the State, allowed it to be answered. We do not find that 
the defendant was prejudiced by the court's sustaining the 
' .State's objection when considered in the light of the com-
plete examination of all of the jurors by both the State 
and the defendant on the subject. The question in a 
.. modified form was asked of all but three of the jurors (who 
. were sworn and served in the case) and answered without 
objection. The cases cited by defendant are not directly 
in point. They deal with the question of prejudice against 
· a defendant himself because of race or other associations 
, or conduct. 
As to the juror "Borke" a question much like the one 
propounded to juror Verlinger considered, was asked and 
the state's objection thereto sustained. It does not appear 
that defendant reframed the question and the subject was 
not pursued further. As to the jurors who were excused 
, peremptorily by the defendant, three were permitted to 
answer a question on the subject of the same tenor as was 
' 
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answered by the nine jurors selected to try the case, 
prejudice because of marital infidelity of defendant 
two were not interrogated on the subject. 
After the jury was sworn and the agreement to 
panel the two alternate jurors was had, it came to the a 
tion of the court upon information received from an OU! 
side source, that juror "Manning" had not told the tnl' 
in answer to a question as to whether or not he had b 
a witness in a criminal case. The juror's answer had b ·:t. 
"No." The information that then came to the court 
parties was that this juror had been arrested on a mor, 
charge and upon conviction had been sentenced to 
workhouse, sentence suspended. This took place in 1943~:: 
The court, after knowledge that the state was going: ' 
to object to juror Manning, although then sworn as a:~ 
juror, prnceedcd to empanel the alternate jurors. Afterj 
the alternate jurors were sworn Juror Manning was then .. 
asked if he had testified in the 1943 incident to which he'~ 
answered, "I believe I did, sir. I don't know, yes, I did.",~1 
He also stated he had gotten into an emotional state of~ 
mind by having this past experience given such publicity. 
He stated that since the happening of such event he hadi 
lived an honorable life and was the father of a family.< 
The defendant entered an objection to juror Manning being 
dismissed from the jury. After the alternative jurors 
were sworn juror Manning stated in part in open court: 
"I tried to be absolutely unbiased and unprejudiced in 
talking to other people, even in speaking outside the 
jury. But after what has happened, I would not be 
able to sit in the box with the other jurors, be able to 
sit in this case and be unbiased, unprejudiced or un-
emotional is what I am trying to drive at mostly. If 
( 
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·-~;this keeps up, if I am kept on the jury, I think I will 
··~be a sub-headlines as long as the trial goes on. I will 
' definitely have a nervous breakdown in a very short 
.t, time and, in fact, I feel I am just about ready for 
~- one right now." 
, The court excused Juror Manning in the exercise of 
sound discretion, under the authority of Sec. 2945.29 
C. which provides: 
;'."If before the conclusion of the trial a juror becomes 
sick, or for other reason is unable to perform his 
duty, the court may order him discharged. In that 
case if alternate jurors have been selected, one of 
them shall be designated to take the place of the juror 
so discharged * * * _,, 
The defendant entered his exception to the proce-
~ure used by the court in discharging juror Manning and 
:.cJ.emanded the right to exercise his remaining peremptory 
.. challenge when the first alternate juror was seated in the 
'j>anel after Manning was discharged, which request was 
l'efused. 
./j After a jury is sworn and charged with the delivery of 
'.the defendant, the trial is commenced and unused peremp-
,,... 
~fl;Jry challenges cannot thereafter be used and where an 
3alternate juror has been selected and sworn as provided 
i by law, he must be seated in the place of the discharged 
f juror by order of the court. 
One other error is claimed in the impanelling of the 
jury. The court granted the state's challenge for cause as 
to juror Richter who was called to be impanelled as the 
,'.'9€Cond alternate juror. The evidence shows that this 
;:; prospective juror had met both the defendant and his wife 
rand had played golf with Mrs. Sheppard. Under oath, 
( 
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however, she stated that her "acquaintance with 
was so slight that I don't think-I know it would not in 
£ere with my opinion." After again answering "yes" to 
question of whether she could be a fair and impartial j 
in the case, keeping in mind that she had known both . 
..... _ 
defendant and deceased, the court granted the state's mi· 
tion challenging her for cause. Section 2945.25 R. C. d~ 
not include acquaintance as a ground of a challenge f1 
'~·. 
cause and when a prospective juror under oath states tha1 
such acquaintance will in no way prejudice her and 
she can act fairly and impartially as a juror, it constitu 
error to grant a motion to discharge a juror for cau~. 
Such error, however, was not prejudicial to the rights o! 
defendant for two reasons. First, the second alternate 
juror empanelled after Richter was dismissed, did not be-
come a member of the panel that was finally c4arged with, 
the deliverance of the defendant at the conclusion of the 
trial. At the conclusion of the trial the second alternate 
juror was dismissed and took no part in deliberating upon 
the verdict. Add second, the state did not use up its per-·· 
emptory challenges in empanelling the alternate jurors and 
it is therefore quite probable that it would have excused f 
juror Richter peremptorily had the motion to dismiss her 
for cause been overruled. , 
Assignments of error Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 14 are ~­
therefore overruled. 
Assignments of error Nos. 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 
and 29 are treated together in defendant's brief under the 
heading: "The court erred in denying the motions for di-
rected verdict or for dismissal of the indictment." This · · 
heading is divided into three sections: 
( 
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"l. The state has the burden of proof to establish 
·' defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
"'. 2. In the absence of substantial evidence on all 
· the elements of the crime charged against the defend-
ants, it is the duty of the court to direct a verdict. 
3. That there is no substantial evidence of de-
fendant's guilt but rather supports defendant's story 
and is inconsistent with his guilt." 
The elements of the crime of murder in the first de-
as here charged against defendant and as defined 
···~ Sec. 2901.01 R. C. are that defendant purposely killed 
ilyn Sheppard of deliberate and premeditated malice. 
.. .ere is no question but that the venue of the crime 
~Charged is in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Likewise, the death 
!iof Marilyn Sheppard is not in question. That she was the 
victim of a brutal murder is not in dispute. The defendant 
in his brief on page 267 says: 
"It is true that an intent by someone to kill the dece-
dent and that there was malice on the part of whoever 
did the killing may be inferred from the nature of the 
wounds and from the brutal and vicious attack that 
was made." 
/And on page 12 of his brief defendant says: 
"Marilyn Reese Sheppard, aged 30 years, was mur-
dered in the bedroom of her home some time between 
midnight and 5: 30 A.M. on Sunday July 4th, 1954." 
The murder is described in the closing arguments of the 
state (record p. 6904) "as one of the most brutal and vici-
~us murders in the history of crime." The evidence of the 
i>athologist of the coroner's office and county coroner giv-
X ing opinion evidence of the cause of death, supported by 
( 
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pictures, portrays in all of its horrible detail the sc, , 
Marilyn Sheppard's bedroom on the morning of Jul 
1954. Lying in a blood soaked bed with 35 separate wd' 
evidently resulting from blows of a blunt instr ·· '., 
about her head and hands, in some instances of sufficit 
force to cause fractures of the skull, is unquestionably~ 
ficient for the jury to find that the person who inflicted . 
,_.,, 
wounds upon the person of the deceased, acted with a p· 
pose to kill. The only questions left for consideration 
the jury, which fact must be shown beyond reasona· 
doubt, that the defendant was the person who commi 
the acts causing the death, and if established by that 
gree of proof then to determine the degree of murder . 
defined by the statutes. 
We go, therefore, directly to an examination of 
evidence dealing with this question. It must be rem~ 
bered that on appeal the court does not retry the issuei' 
of fact but is concerned only with whether there is suf~ 
ficient and ample evidence to require a submission of the~ 
case to the jury and where a verdict has been returnedJ 
·i.''~ 
whether there is substantial evidence (without weighirur,, 
such evidence) to justify the verdict. 
It is the claim of the state that the defendant and th~ .. 
defendant alone, caused the death of his wife. It is the con-,
1 
tention of the defendant that a third person, or third per-'\ 
sons, was or were in defendant's house on the morning of " 
July 4th, who was or were responsible for her death. This, 1 
of course, is not by way of establishing a defense because 1' 
the defendant has no such burden. It is enough if when ·~ 
weighing such evidence when fairly considered with all 
the other evidence in the case, the jury does not find the ·· 
exi~~ence of the essential facts necessary to establish the l ~ 
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endant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the con-
'.tion of the state that only three people were in the 
.eppard house after midnight of the beginning of July 
' , that is, the 7 year old son of the parties, the decedent, 
.d the defendant, and that all the circumstances as shown 
, the evidence point directly to defendant as the one 
iho perpetrated the crime. Also, the claim of defendant's 
unt of his encounters with the supposed intruder or 
.truders and his descriptions of him or them is so un-
·.evable as to give weight to the state's circumstantial 
e. On direct examination in his own defense the de-
dant testified in part as follows: 
"A. The first thing that I can recall was hearing 
Marilyn cry out my name once or twice, which was 
followed by moans, loud moans and noises of some 
sort. I was awakened by her cries and in my drowsy 
recollection, stimulated to go to Marilyn, which I did 
as soon as I could navigate. 
Q. Now, just one question here. Did you have a 
thought in your mind at that time as to what caused 
Marilyn to cry out? 
A. My subconscious feeling was that Marilyn was 
experiencing one of the convulsions that she had ex-
perienced earlier in her pregnancy and I ascended 
the stairway. As I went upstairs and into the room I 
felt that I could visualize a form of some type with a 
light top. As I tried to go to Marilyn I was intercepted 
or grappled. As I tried to shake loose or strike, I felt 
that I was struck from behind and my recollection 
was cut off. The next thing I remember was coming 
to a very vague sensation in a sitting position right 
next to Marilyn's bed, facing the hallway, facing 
south. I recall vaguely recognizing my wallet. 
Q. Now, just a moment. At that point have you 
any way or can you determine-is there any w~ f 
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~':::\ 
determining the length of time between the time yo:~ 
were knocked out and when you came to this sitf '' 
position? 
A. No, sir, no way that I know of. . 
Q. Now, I am handing you state's exhibit 27 an1 
defendant's exhibit T. Is that your wallet? 
A. Yes, sir, it is. 
Q. When was the last time you had it in yo 
hand before I handed it to you this morning? 
A. It must have been that morning. 
Q. That morning. Now, you say-what? 
A. I may have had it in my hand at the inquest.-~ 
I'm not sure whether Doctor Danaceau handed it to'·'.. 
me or just held it. '' 
Q. I see, but-
A. Mr. Danaceau--excuse me. 
* * * 
Q. Now, I have come to the point where you had' 
awakened and saw the faint glow of your badge on 
the floor. Do you remember? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was there a light in the house anywhere? 
A. Yes, sir, there was. 
Q. That you remember? 
A. There was a light. 
Q. And where was that light? 
A. I cannot say for sure, of my own knowledge. 
Q. There was some kind of light? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, then, after you awakened or came to 
consciousness repeat, as best as you can, in your own 
words, to this jury what you saw and what you did. 
A. Well, I realized that I had been hurt and as I 
came to some sort of consciousness, I looked at my 
wife. 
( Q. What did you see? 
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A. She was in very bad condition. She had 
been-she had been badly beaten. I felt that she was 
gone. And I was immediately fearful for Chip. I went 
into Chip's room and in some way evaluated that he 
was all right. I don't know how I did it. I, at this time 
or shortly thereafter, heard a noise downstairs. 
Q. And what did you do when you heard the 
noise downstairs? 
A. And I-I can't explain my emotion, but I was 
stimulated to chase or get whoever or whatever was 
responsible for what had happened. I went down the 
stairs, went into the living room, over toward the east 
portion of the living room and visualized a form. 
Q. Now, where was that form when you first 
visualized him? 
A. Between the front door of the house and the 
yard somewhere. 
Q. Now, are you able to tell the jury what your 
mental condition was when you came out of this-
awoke from this attack? 
A. I was very confused. It might be called 
punchy, in language that we use as slang. I was stimu-
lated or driven to try to chase this person, which I 
did. My-
Q. And when you saw the form, what did you 
do? 
A. Well, I tried to pursue it as well as I could 
under the circumstances. 
Q. And where did you pursue it? 
A. Toward the steps to the beach at which time 
I lost visualization of this form. 
Q. Was it dark? 
A. Beg pardon? 
Q. Was it dark? Dark? 
A. Yes, sir, it was dark but there was enough 
light from somewhere that I could see this form. 
( 
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Q. Yes, all right. ,;1; 
A. I descended the stairway and to the landing;' 
and I visualized the 'form going down, or as he crune~ 
on the beach. And it was at this time that I felt that·,, 
·• I could visualize a silhouette that was describable. 'j 
I-
Q. What happened on the beach? 
I 
A. I descended as rapidly as I could. I lunged 
or lurched and grasped this individual from behind. 
Whether I caught up with him or whether he awaited . 
me, I can't say. I felt as though I had grasped an im-
movable object of some type. I was conscious there-
after of only a choking or twisting type of ~ensation, 
and that is all that I can remember until I came to 
some sort of very vague sensation in the water, the 
water's edge. 
Q. Were you able to determine anything about 
that person? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what? 
A. Well, I felt that it was a large, relatively large 
form; the clothing was dark from behind; there was 
evidence of a good sized head with a bushy appear-
ance at the top of the head-hair. 
Q. Now, then, when you came to the second time, 
just where were you? 
A. I don't knoi exactly where I was. I was-
Q. Were you on the beach? 
A. I was on the beach with--
Q. Where was your head and where were your 
feet? 
A. My feet were in the water and my head was 
directed to the sea wall, toward the south, generally. 
I could have been slightly askew. The waves were 
breaking over me and even moving my lower part of 
C 'UY body some. 
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Q. What was the condition of light at that time? 
A. Light? 
Q. Light, yes. 
A. It was light enough to see at that time. I could 
see Huntington Pier later when I came to enough 
sensation to see at all. 
Q. Day was breaking, is that right? 
A. I would say it had broken somewhat. 
Q. Day had broken. What was your mental and 
physical condition as you remember it now, that you 
were in at the time that you came to consciousness on 
the beach? 
A. My mental condition was that I was extreme-
ly confused. I didn't know where I was or how long 
I had been there, or my own name, for that matter. 
Q. Do you know how long you lied on the beach 
before you got up? 
A. No, sir, I don't. 
Q. Well, you did get up to your feet? 
A. I finally did. 
Q. Do you know how you got up the steps? Do 
you have any recollection of that? 
A. I remember, as I finally came to enough sen-
sation to get to my feet, I rather staggered up the 
stairway and as I was going up, or as I was recog-
nizing that this was my house, I entered the house and 
came to the realization that I had been hurt and that 
I had been struck by an intruder and I was then fear-
ful for Marilyn alth0ugh I can't say that I actually 
remembered of seeing her. 
Q. You remember what? 
A. I don't say that at that time I remembered 
seeing her the previous time upstairs. 
Q. How was your mind working? Was there any 
blocking of your mental processes at that time? 
A. The best I can explain is that my mind was 
• 
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working like a nightmare or a dream, very horrib: '~ 
dream. . 
Q. And then what did you do when you got :~ 
the house? 
A. I eventually went up the stairs. I'm nots .. 
just exactly how rapidly I went upstairs but I dicf 
finally go upstairs and, it was at that time that I ~ 
examined Marilyn. ,. 
Q. Was there enough light in her room then to' 
see her? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you see? 
A. I saw that she had been terribly beat~n. 
Q. Did you determine that she was dead? 
A. Yes, I thought that I did. 
Q. What was your feeling at that particular time, · 
if you had any feeling, that you remember? .:,· 
A. I was horrified. I was shaken beyond ex-
planation, and I felt that maybe I'd wake up, maybe , 
this was all a terrible nightmare or dream and I l 
walked around, paced, I may have rechecked little :.} 
Chip. Very likely I did, but I can't say specifically 
that I did, and I may have gone back in to see Marilyn. 
As I recall-I could have passed out again, I don't 
remember but I was staggered. Finally I went down 
the stairs trying to come to some decision, something 
to do, where to turn. ; must have paced and walked 
around downstairs trying to shake this thing off or 
come to a decision and I thought of a number and 
called it. 
Q. What was the number you thought of? 
A. I thought that the number was that of Mr. 
Houk's. 
Q. Do you recall what you said to him over the 
phone? 
( A. No, I don't. 
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Q. Where was the telephone? 
A. There are two phones downstairs. I'm not 
positive which one I used. 
Q. And do you know how long it was, have you 
any recollection of the length of time between your 
telephone call and the appearance of Mr. and Mrs. 
Houk? 
A. It seemed like a long time, but it evidently 
was a relatively short time. 
Q. And do you know where you were or what 
you were doing between the time that you made the 
telephone call and the arrival of Mr. and Mrs. Houk? 
A. I was walking through the house again and 
trying to-trying to clear my mind, trying to remem-
ber what had happened, trying to remember a de-
scription of this individual that I had seen, trying to 
differentiate whether there two people or one, in fact, 
almost thinking there were two. I, shortly before the 
Houks came, stopped in the kitchen and put my head 
on the table and that is the first time I recall realizing 
or recognizing that I had a very severe pain in the 
neck. Up to that time I may have been holding my 
neck but I don't remember. And at that time I felt 
that my neck was injured." 
On July 4, at 11 A.M. the defendant made the follow-
ing statement to Officer Schottke of the Cleveland Police 
Department as shown by the police report created July 
'i 7, 1954, which was received into evidence as "State's Ex-
hibit 49": 
"Sir: 
The following is the list of questions asked Dr. 
Sam Sheppard on the first time we questioned him on 
July 4, 1954: 
Q. Will you tell us everything that you know 
about this? ( 
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A. He stated that the Aherns were visiting 
that he fell asleep on the couch before they left. 
thing he remembers is that he heard his wife sere< 
ing and he ran up the stairs and as he entered 
room he thought he seen a form and at that time 
heard someone working over his wife. He then 
attacked and hit on the side of the head and knock1 
unconcious. When he tegained consciousness he he< 
a noise downstairs and he ran downstairs and seen 
form going out the door leading to the porch. He rmi~ 
after this form and chased him down the stairs andJ 
when he got to the boathouse landing he doesn't ~ 
1 
member if he jumped over the railing or ~f he ran; 
down to the beach but he half tackled him and he~ 
~ 
struggled with him and was again knocked uncon-), 
scious. 
When he regained consciousness, he was on his -~ 
stomach on the beach being wallowed back and forth 
by the waves. He then went up to the house aiid 
Wjandered around in a daze and went up and went up 
to his wife's room and attempted to administer to her 
and felt that she was gone. He then went downstairs 
and wandered around in a daze and finally a telephone 
number came to his mind and he called this number 
and it was Mayor Houk. He said that Houk came to 
his house and also his brother Richard and he was 
then taken to the hospital. 
Q. Asked him t~ describe the screams. 
A. Stated that they were loud screams. 
Q. How long did the screams last? 
A. Stated all the while he was running up the 
stairs. 
Q. Asked him if the same person attacked him 
that he heard working over his wife. 
A. Stated no, as he was under the impression that 
he was attacked by someone else at the time he heard 
' --meone working over his wife. 
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Q. Asked him how many times he was assaulted? 
A. Stated two or three times at the most. 
Q. With what were you assaulted? 
A. He stated with fists. 
Q. Asked him if he could describe the person that 
went out the door, if that person was white or colored? 
A. He stated the person must have been white 
because the dog always barks at colored people. This 
person was taller than he was, he was about 6'3" and 
was dressed in dark clothing and was a dark com-
plected white man. 
Q. Asked him if he turned on any light at the 
time he looked at his wife in the bedroom. 
A. He stated no. 
Q. Asked him if there were any lights on in the 
house. 
A. He stated he does not remember, he does not 
recall. 
Q. Asked him how he could see to administer to 
his wife if he did not turn on any lights. 
A. He stated he was able to determine there was 
nothing he could do for her and that she was gone. 
Q. Asked him as to the condition as to light and 
darkness at the time he regained consciousness on the 
beach. 
A. He stated it was a little lighter than dark. 
Q. Asked him if the doors were kept locked in 
the house. 
A. He stated the doors were never locked. 
Q. Asked him if there was a great deal of money 
kept around the house. 
A. Stated no, only about $60 or $70. 
Q. Asked if any narcotics were kept in the house. 
A. Stated no, but there may be a few samples in 
my desk. 
Q. Asked him about Dr. Hoversten staying at his 
house and where he was at now. ~ 
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A. He stated Dr. Hoversten was staying at 
house for a few days but that he had left yester1 
afternoon to keep a golf date at Kent, Ohio. 
Q. Asked him if he had heard rumors to the 
feet that Dr. Hoversten was infatuated with his 
A. He stated that he had heard those rumors b 1 
he did not think anything about it and the rumo1': 
might be true. . 
Q. Asked him if he knew of any men that may: 
have stopped at his home while he was at work. 
A. He stated that several men have stopped bu( 
that his wife was faithful to him. f 
Q. Asked him if he could name any of them. 'j 
A. Stated that he could not think of any names 
right now. 
Q. Asked him if he was running around with any 1~ 
women. '' 
A. He stated no. 
Q. Asked him if his wife was running 
with any men. 
1 A. Stated no." 
Defendant talked with Coroner Gerber at the hospital 
at about 9 A. M. on July 4th. Dr. Gerber testified as to de-
fendant's statement of the events of the morning of July · 
4th as follows: 
"Q. Did you have a conversation with him? 
A. Yes, sir. ' 
Q. Now will you please relate the conversation? 
A. I asked him if he could tell me what happened, 
that is, I asked Dr. Sam Sheppard if he could tell me 
what happened. He said he would try to and his con-
versation was as follows: 
That he was sleeping on this couch or davenport 
and that he thought he heard someone call him, 
'Sam.' That he immediately jumped off the couch 
' 
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and rushed upstairs. When he got to the head of the 
stairs something clobbered him on the back of the 
' neck or head, and that he was rendered unconscious. 
He doesn't know how long, he stated, he didn't know 
how long he was unconscious but when he came to he 
thought he heard a noise in the living room. That he 
rushed back down the stairs to the living room and 
that he was-he thought that he saw some form going 
out of the doors toward the stairs that lead to the 
back. That he rushed after the form, and that when 
he got to the foot of the stairs that lead actually to the 
beach alongside of the boathouse or bath house, he got 
into a wrestling match or hassle with the form and 
that he was rendered unconscious again, and he woke 
up later and went back up to the house and then went 
into-up the stairs-went into the living room, up the 
stairs to the second floor and into his wife's bedroom 
and felt of her pulse at t~e neck; realized that there 
was something wrong with her, something seriously 
wrong with her, that she was probably dead. That he 
came back downstairs and some time later called 
Mayor Houk. I asked him if he could see this form as 
he went up the stairs from the couch. He said, 'No, it 
was too dark to see.' He couldn't see anything except 
a form. 
I asked him if he could see the form going down 
the stairs to the beach. He said, 'No, just a form. Just 
an outline.' I told him I would not ask him any more 
questions and left. At the time that I was-he was 
talking to me and I was asking these questions, Dr. 
Richard Sheppard came in and another doctor of the 
hospital came in and took-this doctor, other doctor, 
took Dr. Sam Sheppard's blood pressure.'' 
,~ He also stated: * * * 
"That he rushed after this form. He couldn't tell 
definitely what this form was, couldn't tell whet\ 
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it was a human being or whether it was a man 
a woman, whether or not it had a hat on, whether~ 
not he could see any'hair, whether or not it had a C1 ' 
or trousers on." 
The foregoing was repeated at the inquest at Nonnand1.· 
School as shown on page 3101 of the record. 
On the afternoon of July 4th at about 3 P. M. the d~ 
fendant was again questioned by Officer Schottke at whichl, 
time he stated in part as was testified to by Office#) 
Schottke: 
"We then told him that there was blood on1 the band, 
and on the crystal of the wrist watch, asked him if he l 
could tell us how the blood got there. He stated that' 
he remembered that at the time that he regained con-::, 
sciousness in the upstairs bedroom that he had felt his ii, 
wife's pulse at the neck and felt that she was gone qnd ; 
at that time he must have gotten the blood on the J 
wrist watch and he heard a noise downstairs and ran i,.j 
downstairs." ;! 
On July 10th defendant went to the sheriff's office at 
the request of the authorities where a full written state-
ment was made which was in part as follows (State's ex-
hibit 48): 
"* * * I evidently becrme very drowsy and fell asleep. ~ 
I recall wearing summer cord trousers, a white T ,: 
shirt, mocassin type loafers with no shoestrings, I am 
not sure of the socks. I don't know whether I had re-
moved my brown corduroy coat that I had put on 
earlier, or whether I did at this time or not. The next 
thing that I recall very hazily, my wife partially awoke 
me in some manner and I think she notified me that 
she was going to bed. I evidently continued to sleep. 
The next thing I recall was hearing her cry out or ( 
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scream. At this time I was on the couch. I think that 
. she cried or screamed my name once or twice, during 
which time I ran upstairs, thinking that she might be 
having a reaction similar to convulsions that she had 
had in the early days of her pregnancy. I charged into 
our room and saw a form with a light garment I be-
lieve. At the same time grappling with someone or 
something. During this short period I could hear loud 
moans or groaning sounds and noises. I was struck 
down. It seems like I was hit from behind somehow 
and had grappled this individual from in front or 
generally in front of me. I was apparently knocked 
out. The next thing I knew I was gathering my senses 
while coming to a sitting position next to the bed, my 
feet toward the hallway. In the dim light I began to 
come to my senses and recognized a slight reflection 
on a badge that I have on my wallet. I picked up the 
wallet and while putting it in my pocket came to the 
realization that I had been struck and something was 
wrong. I looked at my wife. I believe I took her pulse 
and felt that she was gone. I believe that I thereafter 
instinctively or subconsciously ran into my youngster's 
room next door and somehow determined that he was 
all right. I am not sure how I determined this. After 
that, I thought I heard a noise downstairs, seemingly 
in the front eastern portion of the house. I went 
downstairs as rapidly as I could coming down the 
west division of the steps. I rounded the L of the living 
room and went toward the dining table situated on 
the east wall of the long front room on the lake side. I 
then saw a form progressing rapidly somewhere be-
tween the front door toward the lake and the screen 
door. I pursued this form through the front door, 
over the porch and out the screen door and then on 
down the steps to the beach, where I lunged or jumped 
or grasped him in some manner from the back, either 
body or leg, it was something solid. However, \ i. 
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not sure. This was beyond the steps an unknown 
tance but probably about ten feet. I had the f. 
of twisting or choking and this terminated my _ -~ 
sciousness. 
The next thing I know I came to a very gro 
recollection of being at the water's edge on my fa 
being wallowed back and forth by the waves. 
head was toward the bank, my legs and feet w 
toward the water. I staggered to my feet and c 
slowly to some sort of sense. I don't know how lo 
it took, but I staggered up the stairs toward the ho 
and at some time came to the realization that som 
thing was wrong and that my wife had bee~ injure<J.! 
I went back upstairs and looked at my wife and fel(\ 
her and checked her pulse on her neck and determinetf-
or thought that she was gone. I became or thought. 
that I was disoriented and the victim of a bizarre 
dream and I believed I paced in and out of the roqm 
and possibly into one of the other rooms. I may have 
reexamined her, finally realizing that this was true. I " 
I 
went downstairs. I believe I went through the kitchen 
into my study, searching for a name, a number or what 
to do. A number came to me and I called, believing 
that this number was Mr. Houk's. I don't remember 
what I said to Mr. Houk. He and his wife arrived 
there shortly thereafter. During this period I paced 
back and forth somewhere in the house, relatively 
disoriented, not kno~ing what to do or where to turn. 
I think I was seated at the kitchen table with my head 
on the table when they arrived but I may have gone 
into the den. I went into the den as I recall, either 
before or shortly after they arrived. The injury to my 
neck is the only severe pain that I can recall. I should 
say, the discomfort to my neck. I didn't touch the 
back door on the road side to my recollection. Shortly 
after the Houks arrived, one of them poured a half 
( 'i.ss of whiskey as they knew where we kept a small 
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· supply of liquor, and told me to drink it. I refused, 
since I was so groggy anyway. I was trying to recover 
my senses." 
The defendant's statement of the facts as above set 
r· lrth are to be found with some discrepancies, variations 
omissions, in the testimony of other witnesses when 
ed to tell what the defendant told them when ques-
,oned on the subject. The first declarations of the defend-
·~t were made to Mayor Houk who arrived at the Shep-
, d home shortly before 6:00 A. M. on July 4th in re-
~nse to the defendant's call. The mayor testified the de-
ll 
,fendant said: 
"My God, Spence, get over here quick, I think they 
have killed Marilyn." 
,,He further testified that he went immediately to the Shep-
r pard home and found the defendant in the den, and 
·' 
"I immediately went up to him and asked him what 
happened, words to that effect, and he said, 'I don't 
know exactly but somebody ought to do something for 
Marilyn,' and with that my wife immediately went 
upstairs and I remained with Dr. Sam and I said some-
thing to the effect of 'get hold of yourself' or something 
like that 'can you tell me what happened?' and he 
said, 'I don't know. I just remember waking up on the 
couch and I heard Marilyn screaming and I started 
up the stairs and somebody or something clobbered 
me and the next thing I remember was coming to 
down on the beach.' And that he remembered coming 
upstairs and that he thought he tried to do something 
for Marilyn and he says 'that's all I remember.'" 
Officer Drenkham who received a call from Mayor 
Houk at 5:58 A. M. and who got to the Sheppard home at 
6:02 A. M. stated on direct examination as to what the{,_ 
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fendant said as to his actions when awakened by Maril 
screams: 
"A. I asked the defendant what had happen1 
He said that he heard Marilyn scream that he rem . 
bered fighting on the stairs that he was in the wa ~ 
and then he came upstairs." 
Mrs. Esther Houk, wif~ of the mayor of Bay Villag1 
who accompanied her husband to the Sheppard home, 
going upstairs and viewing the revolting sight in the She· 
- "'; pard bedroom, returned to the kitchen and poured out half 
\ 
a glass of whiskey and offered it to the defendant jWith the 
statement "this might help you." The record then ~ 
closes the following testimony by Mrs. Houk: 
"A. He said, 'No, I don't want it. 
clear now and I have to think.' 
Q. And he did not take the drink? ·~ 
A. I asked him 'shouldn't this help?' but he is a :l 
ddctor, he should know and he said, 'no.' So he didn't l 
take it. 
Q. I see. Then what occurred from the den? 
A. I believe he was talking. 
* * * * * Q. What did he say? <.; 
A. He complained of his neck. He said he thought ~·' 
it was broken. He ntentioned kidding Steve about ;: 
locking his house so tight. Ile said he remembered 
being hit at the top of the stairs and either he was 
chasing someone or someone was chasing him down 
the stairs. I remember that, because I couldn't picture 
anyone chasing him * * *." 
The defendant's brother, Dr. Richard Sheppard ar-
rived shortly after Mr. and Mrs. Houk and Officer Drenk-
ham4 ~ .... d after viewing Marilyn, returned to the den. Mayor 
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.ouk then testified that he heard the following conversa-
"Dr. Richard bent over Dr. Sam and I heard him say 
that 'she is gone, Sam,' or words to that effect, and 
Sam slumped further down in his chair and said, 'Oh, 
my God no' or words to that effect. And I then heard 
Dr. Richard say either 'did you do this?' or 'did you 
have anything to do with this?' and Sam replied, 
'Hell, no.' " 
Shortly after the foregoing conversation with defend-
! ant by those who first came to his house, Dr. Stephen Shep-
f PID-d arrived with a doctor from Bay View Hospital (about 
'"6:15 A. M.) and without consulting authorities, took the 
defendant to Bay View Hospital. 
On the following day, Dr. Hoversten testified about a 
call he made upon the defendant to the hospital, when he 
heard the following conversation between the defendant 
and Dr. Stephen Sheppard: 
"A. Yes, I remember I was sitting on the left hand 
side of the bed and Steve sat near the foot of the bed 
and he advised Dr. Sam to go over in his mind several 
times a day * * * As I recall Dr. Steve addressed Dr. 
Sam and said in words to this effect: 'You should re-
view in your mind several times a day the sequence of 
events as they happened so that you will have your 
story straight when questioned' and then he gave as 
an example 'you were upstairs and you went down-
stairs and from here to here,' and so forth." 
An examination of the foregoing evidence shows that 
as successive inquiries were made of the defendant, his 
answers changed considerably. His first statement shows 
that he did not reach the top of the stairs before encounter-
ing someone or a form. No mention is made about "Ch{" 
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until the statement was made at the sheriff's office on J 
10th. Likewise, the statements do not suggest that d,' 
fendant examined the dec~dent on his first responding .. 
her call, until after the green bag containing defendant'• 
watch, ring and keys were found with blood on the crystal· 
and band of the watch and such fact was called to his atten· 
tion. There could be no possible way under the sequeni . 
of events as testified to by the defendant in which blooaj 
could have gotten on the watch unless it got there beforef 
the defendant had his alleged encounter on the beach. 
When the defendant fell asleep on the couc1¥- in the 
living room on the evening of July 3rd he (by his own 
testimony) was wearing a T shirt, pants, loafers and a 
corduroy jacket. When the Houks arrived at 5:45 A. M. on 
July 4th defendant was bare from the waist up and in his 
statements claims no recollection of what happened to tlie 
T shirt1 The T shirt has never been found or accounted 
for. Chief of Police Eaton when he arrived at 6:30 A. M. 
of July 4th saw the corduroy jacket neatly folded on the 
couch where defendant had been sleeping and Officer 
Drenkham had noticed the jacket in the same position upon 
his arrival at 6:02 A. M. No one of those who arrived at "' 
the Sheppard home prior to the Chief of Police, testified i' 
as to have moved or touch~d the jacket. The defendant is 
not sure but says he has a faint recollection of having re-
moved it while sleeping because he was too warm. Dr. 
Stephen Sheppard testified having observed the jacket on 
the floor. This was prior to 6:30 A. M. However, when 
the photograph was taken at 8 A. M. the jacket was still in 
the position as observed by Officer Drenkham and Chief 
Eaton. 
• 
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The officers who first arrived on the premises made a 
mplete investigation of the house for evidence of any 
fforcible entry, and found all windows and screens locked, 
[~touched and in place, the screens being fastened from 
~the inside and no damage was observed to any of the doors. 
I Defendant testified that the doors of his home were never 
\locked. However Mrs. Ahern testified that before she left (at midnight on the morning of July 4th, she locked the 
· door and chained it on the lake side of the house and the 
maid testified of being locked out on one or more occasions 
· when she came to work in the morning. She also testified 
that it was the practice to leave the street door unlocked 
·· on the mornings she was to report for work, which was 
on a fixed day each week. This testimony is supported by 
that of Dr. Hoversten who said that the first day he visited 
there in July when he came home at about midnight, 
Marilyn called down to him not to lock the door because 
the maid was coming in the morning. The record clearly 
shows the maid was not expected on July 4th. 
Officer Drenkham testified that he patrolled Lake 
,,, Road during the night beginning about 11 P. M. and con-
~? tinuing until 5 A. M. passing the Sheppard home on several 
f'. occasions, and noticed no one on the highway at or near 
the Sheppard home. He also examined the beach at the 
J bottom of the steps by the beach house shortly after 6 A. M. 
and found no foot prints in the sand. Defendant produced 
two witnesses, one of whom reported that while driving 
east on West Lake Road at about 2:15 A. M. on July 4th 
he saw a big man over six feet tall and weighing 190 
" ·~; pounds standing in the Sheppard driveway wearing a light 
T shirt but was unable to describe the rest of the dress. He 
4 
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testified that the stranger had a crew hair cut and was 
bit tanned and that all this was observed in the dead 
night while returning from' a fishing party at Sandus· 
Ohio. The witness had a boat attached to his automobile' 
and testified he was driving 35 miles per hour when he!, 
observed the stranger in the drive near three maple trees~% 
The other witness claims td have been driving west at; 
about 4 A. M. when he observed a stranger near the ceme-
tery which is just west of the Sheppard home. He de- j 
scribed the stranger as having a crew haircut, was 5'9" tall 
and had bulging eyes and was wearing a white shirt. 
Neither of these witnesses came forward until a ~eward 
was offered publicly six or seven days after July 4th al-
though the story of Marilyn Sheppard's death had received 
great publicity, including the story that defendant had 
met with a form with bushy hair in the Sheppard home. ' 
after he heard his wife scream for help. 
Defbndant's testimony was given in support of his 
claim that his home life and that of his wife was loving 
and harmonious. As opposed to this evidence Dr. Hover-
sten testified to conversation in which the witness read and 
discussed with defendant a letter which defendant had 
written and which he intended to mail to his wife, on the 
subject of divorce. The sa1e subject was talked over on 
several occasions and there is some evidence that the de-
fendant discussed this subject with Susan Hayes. There 
is also evidence that after Chip was born Mrs. Sheppard 
was not sexually aggressive and that she had consulted 
with defendant's brother Dr. Stephen Sheppard on the 
subject and its effect on her relationship with her husband 
(the defendant). Defendant admitted meeting with one 
of his. 1 · 1.y patients, at her insistence and request on sev-
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~~al occasions, taking her to Metropolitan Park on at least 
[~ne ~ccasion where they kissed each other and being in-
(.yolved in an altercation between the lady and her husband 
'~bout her attentions to defendant in Mrs. Sheppard's pres-
i ence on a boat trip to Detroit. He called and was in com-
'[ pany of another young lady in California while his wife 
f was in Cleveland. His intimate relationship with Susan 
~; Hayes for more than a year was admitted by defendant 
L ~including his cohabiting with her at the home of Dr. Miller 
fin California for about a week although when first ques-
~ h tioned he denied any such affair and upon the coroner's 
inquest under oath he testified untruthfully on the subject 
by denying such intimacy. 
When the officers arrived at the Sheppard home on the 
morning of July 4th they found a medical bag of defend-
ant open and on its end with some of the contents spilled 
on the floor. Some of the drawers in the desk in the library 
were pulled out and piled on the floor and the tools for de-
fendant's outboard motor, which defendant kept in a green 
cloth bag in the desk, were on the floor in front of the desk, 
together with a broken statue. There was also a green box 
containing fishing tackle on the floor near the tools. Mari-
lyn Sheppard's wrist watch with dry blood on the band 
was lying on the floor near the desk. The contents of one 
drawer had been spilled out after Dr. Richard Sheppard 
accidentally kicked it over. The drawers in the desk in 
the living room were partly pulled out but the contents 
thereof were undisturbed. The lid or cover of the desk was 
open and resting on the back of one of the upholstered 
living room chairs. There were some sales tax stamps and 
papers scattered about on the floor near the desk. 
' 
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The Cleveland police department fingerprint ex 
testified that there were no readable fingerprints on 
desks or in other places about the house; that they 
been wiped off or smudged, and on some of the furnit 
surfaces he found long scratches as if the surfaces hai 
been wiped with sandpaper or a rough cloth of some kin1 
This was equally true of the metal fishing box and drawer& 
piled in the den. 
The picture of Mrs. Sheppard's left wrist showed ati'~ 
impression of the wrist band of her watch in dry blood; 
as if the watch had been pulled from her wrist after the .. 
blood had dried about the wrist band. About 1: ~O P.MY 
the afternoon of July 4th, the mayor's son, while searching 
the bank which extends down to the lake in front of the 
Sheppard home and which is covered with very heavy , 
brush, found the green cloth bag containing the defend- ·~ 
ant's wrist watch, which had stopped at 4: 15, with dry 
I 
blood on the band and crystal and also containing his class 
ring and key chain. The hour at which the watch was 
stopped was 15 minutes after the latest time fixed by the 
county coroner as the time Marilyn Sheppard came to 
her death (between 3 and 4 A.M. on July 4th). There was 
no blood on the bag and there is no dispute but that the 
green bag was the one use~ by defendant to hold his out- ·h 
board motor tools and that he kept them in his desk in the ~t· 
den. 
There was over $200.00 found in various places about 
the house including defendant's wallet which contained 
$63.00 and a check for a large sum of money, all of which 
was easily discovered by the Chief of Police. Defendant 
testified that he discovered his wallet which had been in 
• 
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pocket, on the floor beside him after he came to in the 
room. Except for the green cloth bag, defendant's 
' atch, ring and key chain, there is no evidence that any-
g was missing from the Sheppard home. 
Defendant in his argument to the jury said: 
"Well, of course, we don't claim there was a burglary. 
I mean I don't know why the intruder was there. We 
claim there was a man there but whether he was there 
for burglary or not I don't know. We never claimed 
that he was." 
The evidence of the somewhat disarranged condition of 
'the first floor of the house would tend to show the pres-
ence of an intruder, but if because of the manner in which 
it was done and the other surrounding circumstances no 
Ir such conclusion could be reasonably drawn from the evi-
dence, such condition would give strong support to the 
State's case. The defendant also argues that decedent 
, came to her death at the hands of a sex maniac by whom 
defendant was "clobbered" in his bedroom or on the 
;: ~.stairway to the second floor, and on the beach. It would be 
. difficult to believe that a sex maniac, after discovery, 
~.would take time to set up the appearance of a burglary, or 
f ·that a burglar would throw away the only property found 
, . to have been taken from the house, the green cloth bag 
containing defendant's wrist watch, ring and key chain. 
It is also hard to believe that a burglar would not 
have found and taken defendant's wallet which he says 
was on the floor beside him after he encountered the 
r form in the bedroom, and after monies that were about the 
· house, or that either a burglar or a sex maniac would take 
time or go to the trouble of destroying fingerprints after 
4 
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the defendant was aroused from his sleep, 
person, armed with a blunt instrument, would go abo·"· 
his intended purpose without molesting the defen 
whose presence asleep on the couch could not have b 
missed. 
When the defendant went to sleep on the couch th\ 
green bag containing the tools was in the desk and tht. 
defendant was wearing his wrist watch, ring and kef: 
chain. ~' 
By defendant's own testimony, when responding to'' 
his wife's screams for help, he did not turn on the light&~ 
·' 
either on the stairway while on his way to the be'droom;l 
or in the bedroom. Light switches were conveniently~ 
placed for that purpose. That it was then in the dead of , 
night is clearly shown because when he was following the J 
form to the beach he said it was dark, with some refleco1 f 
tion from Cleveland, and after coming to and starting back 
to the hbuse, he testified the day was just breaking. The 
discovery by defendant that his wife had been so badly 
beaten "that he felt she was gone" particularly when he 
returned from the beach and made as he claimed, his 
second examination of her; that he should do so without 
light, is a fact which the jury had the right to consider, 
together with all of the other evidence of his conduct and 
the surrounding physical £Jets, in determining the credi-
bility to be given his story. Even though day was break-
ing, the evidence was undisputed that the window shades 
were drawn in the murder room, except as to one window 
which was up six inches to let in air. There is evidence in 
the record by a neighbor that she drove by the Sheppard 
home at 2: 35 A.M. on July 4th and saw two lights burn-
( 
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, one on the first floor toward the east side of the house, 
one on the second floor. 
1 No mention is made by defendant about the family 
, although he testified that the intruder must have 
.. n white, because a dog always barks at colored 
,ple. The defendant did not hear the dog bark or at least 
,e gave no testimony to that effect. 
One significant fact to be considered is the passing of 
,ime between the time of Marilyn Sheppard's death and 
''.~e time defendant summoned help and what all the 
... ctivities were that engaged the defendant's attention dur-
:ing that period. 
f' ;Ji: The coroner fixed the time of death as between 3 and {4 A.M. on July 4, 1954. The first call by defendant asking 
i_for help was made between 5: 45 A.M. and 5: 50 A.M. of 
tthat day. The defendant testified that when he followed 
! the form to the beach, it was in the dark of night with 
some reflection of light from Cleveland. At the time he 
: came to on the beach, he testified that it was at about the 
~break of day. It is a matter of public information that on 
' July 4, 1954, the sun rose at 4: 58 A.M. Eastern Standard 
r time or 5: 58 A.M. Eastern Daylight Savings time. The 
. break of day precedes sunrise by about forty minutes. " 
1 
.. So that either between the time of death fixed by the 
coroner, at which time defendant testified he was in the 
, bedroom where decedent died, having responded to her 
'\ call for help, and in his testimony expressed the belief 
I'· 
'\ that she was then gone, or from the time defendant 
~: started from the beach to the house after encountering the 
.I>, ·~.form there (defendant's testimony being the only authority 
' for this fact) from forty minutes to two hours passed. 
• 
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There is little or no attempt to account for 
actions during this period. It is also true that there w., 
neighbors on both sides who were not disturbed. Thi 
were much closer in point of distance to the defend 
than was Mayor Houk. 
The evidence shows also that there was a telephon1 
between the twin beds in the murder room which was not· 
used by defendant to call help after he regained con~1 
sciousness from his first encounter with the form eithi 
or the stairs or in the bedroom. Likewise, when chasmg' 
the form to the beach, the defendant did not avail hims 
of any weapon although there were firearms !vailable in' 
the den and fire tools in the fireplace in the living room:'1 
which he passed in going out the door to the lake side of! 
the house. 
The defendant's injuries were the subject of some 
conflicting testimony. Doctors testifying for the State de-
scribed his injuries as injuries to the right cheek of the;, 
face, a black eye, some damage to the right side of his 1 
forehead, some damage to the membrane of his mouth, ' 
and no indication of any injury to the back of the neck. 
Doctors for defendant not only report the injuries to the 
right side of his face, eye and mouth but also injuries to 
the spinous process of the second cervical vertebrae and 
some swelling on the bJck of the neck. They do not claim 
that the skin was broken at this point. Whatever injuries 
the defendant sustained were caused by a blow or blows 
of the fist of an assailant. This was defendant's testimony,',, 
although he testified that his first encounter was in the l 
bedroom where his wife came to her death as a result of " 
many blows on the head with a blunt instrument. It was 
( 
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this occasion and only then, that the defendant claims 
. t there might have been two assailants "one working 
,?., 
·· ·er his wife" and the other striking defendant from the 
ck with his fist. While he was following the form to the 
. ach there was no suggestion that there was more than 
.e object or form in front of him. 
.. The foregoing is a summary of much of the evidence 
pealing with many of the physical facts and conditions of 
.e premises as found on July 4th and of declarations and 
tactions of the parties involved as testified to by the public 
ruthorities and other witnesses, together with what the 
~efendant said to others and in his testimony upon trial in 
.relation to the events of the morning. The testimony of 
/the defendant, in dealing with the events that took place 
" ljn his presence or the things that he did, was characterized 
~by the State as vague, indefinite, uncertain or factually 
bughly improbable. During the time he was under cross-
!examination the defendant gave evasive answers such as 
.,,'I can't recall" or "I can't remember,'' approximately 216 
times to questions concerning facts and circumstances 
lthat took place in his claimed presence material to the 
r~ues in the case. 
:~. The jury, under the instructions of the court, was 
''l" 
··rresented with but one question or issue of fact and that 
,was, "had the State shown beyond reasonable doubt that 
:·} 
"the defendant purposely killed Marilyn Sheppard?" 
The State's case is based in part on circumstantial 
l~vidence. The law of Ohio on this subject requires that the 
']acts and circumstances upon which the theory of guilt is 
based must be established beyond reasonable doubt and 
;~ the facts so established must be entirely irreconcilable 
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with any claim or theory of innocence and admit of 
other hypothesis than the guilt of the accused. Carter, 
State, 4 Oh. App. 193. 
If, therefore, the jury, after careful deliberation, £o 
that there was any possible hypothesis of innocence, . 
a consideration of all of the evidence, then the defendant' 
would be legally entitled to be discharged, but if the jury1. 
found, after full deliberation, there was no possibieJ 
hypothesis of innocence based on the facts as they found 
them to be, and that the facts found are such as to bei 
irreconcilable with any other reasonable hypothesis, than1 
the guilt of the accused, then a verdict of guilty1 was re-l 
quired. 
This was a jury question and we hold that there was : 
sufficient evidence to support the verdict of guilty as 
found by the jury. 
Clpims of error Nos. 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 
are therefore overruled. 
Assignments of error under the heading of "The ad-
mission of testimony" in subhead VI of defendant's brief 
will next be considered. During the trial, pictures in color 
that had been taken of the wounds of Mrs. Sheppard's 1~: 
head, after the blood had been washed away, were shown .. 
Six black and white pictu~es were developed from these 
negatives and received in evidence, which were explained 
by the deputy county coroner. The colored pictures were 
then shown to the jury through the use of a projecting 
machine on a screen six feet by six feet, the pictures being 
four feet square. It is claimed that such pictures exag-
gerated the size of the wounds and unfairly emphasized 
the evidence of the cause of death. Except for the size of 
t 
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.e pictures, there is no claim that they were distorted or 
ccurate. They dealt with a subject vital to one of the 
ues of fact, that is, the cause of death and the severity 
pf the blows. 
In the case of Cincinnati Traction Co. vs. Harrison 
(24 C. C. N. S. 1 on page 6) the court said on this subject: 
"As to the photograph, it was an enlarged one, but 
was not for that reason inadmissible." 
The defendant was not prejudiced by the manner of 
~·, 
:.showing these pictures. 
~ It is further claimed that the testimony of Mrs. Ahern 
·with regard to conversations she had had with the deced-
ent about divorce, was improperly received in evidence. 
~ She testified that Mrs. Sheppard had told her that the 
1· defendant had discussed the possibility of seeking a ~ 
divorce from her with Dr. Chapman while in California. 
At the very outset of the trial the defendant stated as a 
·. fact that he and his wife were happy and living a har-
monious and lovable married life, and on his defense he 
testified to support of such statement. Aside from the 
alleged conversation between Mrs. Ahern and the decedent, 
there is considerable testimony as to conversations the 
defendant had with others (particularly Dr. Hoversten 
and Miss Hayes) on the subject of divorce, such conversa-
tions being in part admitted by the defendant. He, how-
ever, denies ever suggesting seriously a separation with 
his wife and maintains throughout that they lived happily 
together. Statements such as were given in evidence or 
testified to by Mrs. Ahern as a statement made by the 
decedent, are always admissible to show that the state-
ment was made or to establish the state of mind of thP ( 
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parties where their relationship is material to the issuea:· 
in the case. 
1 
In the case of Cassidy vs. Ohio Public Service Co.f'~ 
83 Oh. App. 404 (a negligence case), the court at page 410 'i 
quotes with approval from 6 Wigmore on Evidence, (3rd, 
Ed.) page 185, Sec. 1770 as follows: 
"Where the utterance 
1
of specific words is itself a part.,, 
of the details of the issue under the substantive law~ 
and the pleadings, their utterances may be proved 
without violation of the hearsay rule, because they 
are not offered as evidence of the truth of the matter 
that may be asserted therein." I 
Also, in paragraph 1730 of the same work, headed "State-
ment of another (Bias, Fear, Malice, Affection etc.) Wife's 
or Husband's Declarations." 
''* :!: * 
2. A special application is found in actions for 
alJ.ienation of affections, criminal conversation, divorce 
or wife murder where the state of affections of the 
wife to her husband or of the husband to the wife be-
comes material. Here the declarations of the person 
as to her or his own state of affections are admissible 
under the present principle * * *" (Hearsay rule) 
(emphasis added). 
In 31 C. J. S. page 9f38 Title "Evidence," parag. 239, 
dealing with independent relevant statements, it is said: 
"Where the fact that a particular statement was 
m;1de is of itself a relevant fact, regmdlcss of the truth 
or falsity of such statement, the statement is admis-
sible as evidence as an independent relevant fact." 
The cases cited by defendant are not in point. Potter 
vs. Baker, 162 0. S. 488, deals with spontaneous state-
f 
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.ents of third persons at the time of an accident. Geller 
'~S. Geller, 115 0. S. 468, was concerned with the letter of 
'an unknown third person and the other cases are likewise 
Jar afield from the legal question here being considered. 
Even if it be argued that there is no sound legal basis 
for the inquiry of what the deceased said of statements 
. of defendant to Dr. Chapman about divorce, yet, because 
,; of the state of the record on that subject the defendant's 
admitted relationships with other women which came to 
the knowledge of the decedent, the watch incident which 
was a part of the same conversation between the decedent 
and Mrs. Ahern (the watch given to Susan Hayes having 
been previously the subject of some slightly animated 
discussion between defendant and his wife) we do not 
find that the defendant was prejudicially affected by the 
admission of this evidence abcmt which he complains. 
Defendant complains also about the admission of testi-
mony given by Mrs. Houk that the defendant told her that 
in an automobile accident where no physical injury is ap-
parent, a head injury could be easily claimed. 
In view of the highly controverted state of the record 
,, as to whether or not the defendant sustained an injury 
} to the back of his neck and head we find no error in the " 
::'!-· 
admission of this testimony. 
Defendant also complains about the extensive cross-
examination of the defendant about Margaret Kauzor and 
Mrs. Lossman and calling attention to the defend-
ant's untruthful testimony given under oath at the coro-
ner's inquest about his relations with Susan Hayes. The 
defendant also claims as error a question directed to the 
defendant on cross-examination which assumed that de-
f 
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fendant killed his wife, to which the defendant answ1 
"That is absolutely unt~ue and unfair." The question 
tainly was proper under the circumstances. 
The defendant also claims error in permitting Ma: 
1 
Houk to testify to submitting to a lie detector (polygraph) 
test. The record shows t
1
hat Dr. Stephen Sheppard at oi1 
point in the investigation, indicated that Mayor Houk w8'.: 
in some way involved. After this was brought out 
Mayor was asked "Did you, Mr. Houk, submit to a lie de-' 
tector test?" to which he answered over defendant's obo.
1i 
jection, "Yes." The results of the test were npt inquired! 
~ 
about, and the simple fact that a test was made by agree-1 
ment of the witness under the circumstances could not 
prejudice the defendant's case. 
We likewise overrule the claims of error because of .'-· 
the claimed "unfair and biased testimony of the coroner." 
If the coroner, in his testimony, was not testifying within 
the orbit of his personal knowledge, cross-examination is 
the weapon within the use of the defendant to demonstrate 
that fact before the jury, to the damage of the State's case. 
The foregoing claims of error are therefore overruled. 
Errors concerned with the exclusion of testimony are 
grouped by the defendant under the title "The Court erred 
in exclusion of testimon~." 
The first claim of error under this heading is the re-
fusal of the court to require the coroner to produce certain 
records on the claim that they were public in character. 
The records referred to were the work sheets of the 
technicians of the coroner's office. These papers are not of 
the character of "public records," and no error was com-
mitted by refusing to direct their production in court. 
' 
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' . The failure to order the coroner to produce a police 
1port that had been given to him by the police department 
t not error. This report is the same one that was later re-
,kived in evidence and while the court's ruling holding 
t;pat the coroner need not produce a police department 
record was correct, its later introduction would cure any 
,. 
:~possible error. 
\) The defendant claims that he was restricted in his 
~cross-examination of Dr. Hexter on the subject of shock 
~-~and as to the cross-examination of Officer Schottke on 
'whether or not the defendant cooperated in the police in-
vestigation of the cause of his wife's death. Neither of 
/these claims are well founded. After an objection to a 
question put to Dr. Hexter was sustained because of its 
form, the defendant conducted a searching cross-examina-
tion of the doctor on the subject of shock. Whatever re-
striction the defendant suffered by the court's sustaining 
the objection claimed as error was fully corrected by sub-
sequent questions which were fully answered. The ques-
tions to Officer Schottke asked for conclusions of fact and 
the State's objections were properly sustained. 
The next claim of error under this heading is the 
~ court's refusal to permit evidence on what the defendant 
calls similar offenses or other acts of burglary committed 
or attempted in Bay Village. It is the claim of the defend-
ant that homes of two citizens of Bay Village were entered 
by intruders, one in September and the other on July 7, 
1954. We know of no theory of law that would make such 
testimony competent in this case. The court was not in er-
ror in ruling against the introduction of this evidence. 
• 
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The remaining claims of error under this heading1 
concerned with the court's failure to permit a juro:' 
question the defendant while he was testifying in his~ 
fense, refusing to allow Don Ahern to give opinion , 
dence as to whether or not the defendant was a "d1 
sleeper" and also in sustaining objection to questions·i' 
Dr. Adelson, the pathologist of the coroner's office, as · 
his opinion of the cause of the wounds on the hands f. 
Mrs. Sheppard. . 
The right of a juror to ask questions of a witness d ' 
ing trial is clearly within the sound discretion of \he tri, 
court. Utah vs. Anderson (Sup. Ct. of Utah) 159 A. L. R} 
340. The practice is not encouraged because: . 
"generally jurors are not familiar with the rules gov· 
erning the admission of evidence and in the very 
ture of such a situation, counsel quite naturally wilJ'1 
hesitate to object to a question propounded by a juror, 
even though it may be competent, and this practice~, 
so dangerous to the rights of the litigants that we can!P 
not encourage the practice." 
White vs. Little, 131 Okla., 132, 268, p. 221. 
For further authorities see annotation following the,. 
case of Utah vs. Anderson, 159 A. L. R. 347. 
This claim of error is )herefore overruled. it' 
The other two claims of error just above listed are 
likewise overruled, the questions involved not being ma-
terial to the issues in the case. 
Assignments of error listed in paragraph 6 of defend- 1 
ant's brief entitled "Errors in conduct of trial" will now be~' 
oomhlff~. : 
During the trial of the case (which lasted about five' 
week( ·he bill of exceptions being bound 
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.es, totaling 7,102 pages together with a supplemental 
of exceptions containing the opening statements, of 
16 pages) the court suggested on a few occasions that 
.e proceeding was not going forward with sufficient dis-
, .tch and on one occasion the court said that it should not 
:e over a day to determine the cause of death. There are 
.er complaints of the defendant because of remarks of 
, .e trial judge of which the following is typical: 
"The Court: Well, Mr. Corrigan, we can't go on 
with this witness forever. We will have to somehow or 
other get through with the witness. 
Mr. Corrigan: Well, he has not got his pictures 
here. 
The Court: Well, in any event, we are making 
too much of a ritual of every bit of movement, and I 
don't think we ought to take the time. It is not fair 
to these jurors nor fair to anybody. 
* * * 
Mr. Corrigan: Now, Your Honor, I am here to 
defend a man for murder. 
The Court: I know, but we try other murder 
cases too. We have to try other people as well." 
~: There was also some discussion before the jury about 
the defendant demanding the return of the keys to his 
~ouse, which he claims was necessary for him to have in 
making out his defense. This claim is countered with 
proof that defendant or his representative was at liberty 
to go to his house at any time on request, when in the 
::company of a police officer. 
, It is likewise claimed that there was disorder during 
~e trial and defendant in his brief lists eleven places in 
lhe record when order was called for because of noise in 
h? 
'y out of the courtroom. ( 
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'.~ 
It is also claimed that the court arranged the co~c' 
room to accommodate a great many representatives of thl 
press, radio and television and other news disseminating· 
agencies, thus restricting accommodations available for 
others. The record shows that the defendant's family wa8. 
~ 
provided for and that the defendant's brother, Dr. Stephen~ •. 
Sheppard, although a witness1, was permitted by order of·~ 
the court to remain in the courtroom throughout the trial. ;~ 
,ti 
The court in this case was presented with a very difficult ~. 
matter because of the unusual amount of coverage at-
tempted by the press, radio and television agencie1. The 
arrangements made by the court were within its sound '' 
discretion. Certainly the defendant was afforded a public 
trial, and from a reading of the record, we cannot say that 
the court in seeking to maintain an orderly proceeding j 
abused its discretion in directing the courtroom arrange- · '' 
men ts. 
Pierpont vs. State, 49 Oh. App. 77; 
Makley vs. State, 49 Oh. App. 359. 
It is also claimed that the jury was not properly ad-
monished upon separation during the trial. 
A careful examination of the record as to each of the 
foregoing claims of error shors that the proceedings were 
regular in every respect and the claims of error are there-
fore overruled. 
It is likewise claimed in this section that the court 
should have charged on the included offenses of "Assault 
and battery and assault" and that in holding the jury to-
gether for five days after submission of the case, coerced 
them into agreeing on a verdict. 
' 
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The claim that assault and battery and assault should 
~have been charged must be overruled. There is no ques-
• ltion but that decedent was killed as a proximate result of 
!. the unlawful wounds inflicted upon her person. Death, 
without question of doubt, resulted from the unlawful acts 
of the killer, and the only factual issue in the case being 
' whether or not the defendant committed the various as-
saults on her person. The case cited by defendant of Bandy 
vs. State, 102 0. S. 384, 131 N. E. 499, is direct authority 
" against this claim of error. Paragraph 2 of the syllabus 
"2. If the indictment charges murder in the first 
degree in the perpetration of a robbery under Sec. 
12400 G. C. and there is no evidence tending to sup-
port a charge of murder in the second degree, or man-
slaughter, as distinguished from murder in the first 
degree, then the defendant, upon the failure of proof 
as to murder in the first degree, is entitled to an ac-
quittal, and in such case it is not error for the court 
to refuse to charge either murder in the second degree 
or manslaughter." 
See also State vs. Muskus, 158 0. S. 276, 109 N. E. 
2d, 15. 
The case was submitted to the jury on the morning of 
Friday, December 17th. At the noon hour the jury was put 
under the care of two bailiffs who were sworn and in-
structed as to their duties. The deliberations of the jury 
continued through Saturday and Sunday, the defendant 
objecting to the Sunday session. On Monday evening, no 
communication having been received from the jury as to 
their progress the court instructed the parties that at 10 
P. M. the bailiff should inquire as follows: 
• 
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"Have you arrived at a verdict? If not, is there a prob" 
ability that you can arrive at one if you deliberate~1 
while longer, either this evening or tomorrow? If ' 
which would you prefer?" 
The jury's reply was that they were close to a verdi~ 
and desired to retire at that time and resume deliberationsf 
in the morning. The jury ~eturned its verdict on Tuesday{t' 
December 21, 1954 at 4: 33 P. M. · · 
At no time during their deliberations did the jury orl 
any member of the panel, suggest that there was no hope ~i 
of a verdict or that they did not desire to conti~ue theirl 
deliberations. The jury was called into open court three _; 
times a day during deliberations so that there were many 
opportunities for them to express their feelings if they de- ~1: 
sired to do so. With the great number of exhibits and 7,102 
pages of evidence the jury was unquestionably painstak-
ing irn its approach to the serious question presented to 
them and their willingness to take whatever time that was 
reasonably necessary under the circumstances, to do jus-
tice between the State of Ohio and the defendant, cannot 
be grounds for criticism. We do not find that there is any . · 
basis for the claim that the jury was coerced into a verdict. 
The claims of error under the heading "Errors in con-
duct of trial" are therefoie overruled. 
The defendant groups assignments of errors Nos. 14, 
22 and 23 under the title "The court erred in its charge 
to the jury." 
The defendant requested the court to reduce its 
charge to writing as provided by Sec. 2945.10 R. C. which 
provides: 
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"The court, after the argument is concluded and before 
proceeding with any other business shall forthwith 
charge the jury. Such charge shall be reduced to 
writing by the court if either party requests it before 
the argument to the jury is commenced. Such charge 
or other charges or instructions provided for by this 
section when so written and given shall not be orally 
qualified or modified or explained, by the court." * * * 
Before the trial was concluded, the court had written 
its charge and a copy given to counsel for the State and 
for the defendant before argument. The trial came to an 
end after counsel for the State concluded its final argument 
to the jury at about 4: 15 P. M. of Thursday, December 16, 
1954. The court then addressed the jury as follows: 
"The Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury we 
will now be adjourned until, shall we say, nine o'clock 
tomorrow morning. I would like to get a fairly early 
start, but if we are not all here at nine o'clock we will 
not, of course, until we are all here, but as soon as 
possible after nine o'clock I would like to have the 
court convene. In the meantime, will you be very 
careful-now we are in the closing stages-not to 
discuss this case or reach any point whatever where 
you are seeking or securing any information or no-
tions or statements from anybody about it. The law 
of this State provides that when a jury is charged with 
the final word in the case, and a jury proceeds in the 
secrecy of its jury room to deliberate and to determine 
the issues that are to be determined, that from that 
point on, and continuing until such time as they and 
the Court together, if that should have to come to 
pass, are not able to agree--or rather, they and the 
Court are agreed that the jury cannot agree upon a 
verdict, or a verdict is rendered, the jurors must be 
• 
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kept together. This case is important. It may . 
you a short time, nobody knows. It may take yo 
some time, nobody knows. But, in any event, I 
sure you appreciate that fact that it is a case that doe$•,, 
need deliberation and care in its decision, whatevel;~ 
that decision may be, and for that reason, it may gJ;. 
over tomorrow. If it does, it will be necessary for you}; 
to remain in the comfort-some people think it is a' 
discomfort-of a downtown hotel. The Court will'.. 
take care of all of those details, if they are to be taken ·, 
care of, so I am saying to you now so that you may 
come tomorrow morning prepared, if necessary, to~ 
remain in a downtown hotel tomorrow ni~ht underA 
the care and as guests of the Court and its officers. l~ 
Mr. Corrigan: I except to the instructions of the ~ 
Court. 
The Court: Sir? 
Mr. Corrigan: I except to your instruction. 
The Court: What is erroneous about it? 
, Mr. Corrigan: I say, I except to your instruc-
tions. 
The Court: Oh, yes, all right. Without any for-
mality at all, we will be adjourned until 9 o'clock to-
morrow morning." (Whereupon adjournment had.) 
Court was then adjourned until 9 A. M. of Friday, 
December 17, 1954. At this time in the absence of the 
jury, the defendant excep,ed to parts of the written charge 
on reputation and character evidence and on the law as to 
circumstantial evidence and presented requested charges 
in writing which requests were overruled. The court then 
proceeded to read its written instructions to the jury in i 
open court without deviation from the prepared charge. 
The record does not show that any other business of 
the court was conducted after the close of court on De-
( 
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:cember 16th and the opening of court on December 17, 
~ . 
.954. 
~- From the foregoing recital of the record, it is clear 
. ·at no part of the court's instructions on the law of the 
}:ase was given on Dec. 16th and that the entire charge 
,!on the law was in writing as requested by defendant. Sec. 
' 1,~45.10 R. C. was strictly complied with so that claims of 
·~or that the court failed to reduce its charge to writing, 
, ~t part was given one day and part the next, and that 
·~ ~·the court failed to give its charge immediately after con-
,, eluding arguments, must all be overruled. 
.. ' The duty to proceed to charge the law of a case as re-
i; quired by Sec. 2945.10 R. C. supra, means to proceed with-
in the regular hours of the court day which are provided 
~· for by Rule 23-C of the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga 
1. [ County. 
The defendant assigns as error under this division of 
the brief (error No. 23) that the court refused to give writ-
'', ten instructions on points of law before argument. This 
error is claimed but there is no argument in support of it 
in the brief. 
Sec. 2945.10-E R. C. provides: 
"When the evidence is concluded, either party may 
request instructions to the jury on points of law which 
instructions shall be reduced to writing if either party 
requests it." 
This section empowers, but does not require, the court 
\ to give such instructions. The following cases support the 
·~. court's denial of such request and there is no claim that 
'1; the substance of such requests were not included in the 
general charge of the court. 
• 
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State vs. Petro, 148 0. S. 473, 76 N. E. 2d 355; .. 
Grossweiler vs. State, 113 0. S. 46, 148 N. E. 
Wertenberger vs. State, 99 0. S. 353, 124 N. E. 24'., 
State vs. Williams, 85 0. App. 236, 88 N. E. 2d, 420~, 
State vs. Cheatwood, 84 0. App. 125, 82 N. E. iJ .. 
770. 
There remains to cor1isider the court's charge on th; 
subject of the use of character evidence and the rule to be 
followed when the State's case depends entirely or in sul>.! 
stantial part on circumstantial evidence. 
] 
On the first question, the court charged tl;.e jury as 1 
follows: 
"Some evidence has been given in this case con-~ 
cerning the claimed general conduct and reputation ' 
of the defendant and it is proper to present such evi- ; 
deuce for your consideration. It is not admitted be-
1m1se it furnishes proof of guilt or innocence, but be- ,, 
cause it is a matter of common knowledge that people 
of good character and reputation do not generally 
commit serious or major crimes. Such evidence, if be-
lieved, may be of some help to you in your considera-
tion of the total evidence and the situation as a whole. 
The court wishes to caution you, however, that good ·~ 
character and good reputation will not avail any per-
son charged with a ~crime against proof of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt." 
This charge is fully supported by the holding of this 
court in the case of State vs. Neal, 97 Oh. App. 339, 118 
N. E. 2d 424 (Motion to certify overruled). We hold that 
the law was correctly stated by the court. 
Harrington vs. State, 19 0. S. 264; 
' 
Stewart vs. State, 22 0. S. 477. 
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Paragraph 4 of the syllabus of Stewart vs. State, su-
·a, provides: 
"In a criminal case it is error to instruct the jury that 
evidence of the defendant's good character is not to 
be considered by the jury or made available to the 
defendant except in doubtful cases; the true and 
proper rule being to leave the weight and bearing of 
such evidence to the jury. Harrington vs. State, 19 
0. S. 264 approved p. 268." (Emphasis added.) 
The charge on circumstantial evidence was as fol-
"* * * Where circumstantial evidence is adduced, it 
together with all the other evidence must convince 
you on the issues involved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and that where circumstantial evidence alone is relied 
upon in the proof of any element essential to a finding 
of guilty, such evidence; together with any and all 
other evidence in the case, and with all the other facts 
and circumstances of the case as found by you, must 
be such as to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt 
and be consistent only with the theory of guilt and 
inconsistent with any theory of innocence. If evidence 
is equally consistent with the theory of innocence as it 
is with the theory of guilt, it is to be resolved in favor 
of the theory of innocence." 
The request of the defendant is in substance the same 
t, as the charge as given, and as given is fully supported by 
t 
s the case of Carter vs. State, 4 Oh. App. 193. The defend-
. ant's claims of error Nos. 14, 22 and 23 are overruled. 
Finally, paragraph 8 of defendant's brief claims "Er-
, rors in overruling the motion for new trial.'' 
There is some claim that the jurors were allowed to 
; separate and to communicate with outsiders by telephone 
~ . ~~; ' 
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during their deliberations. A photograph was taken of 
jury in the dining room of the Carter Hotel. Their sep . 
tion was only sufficiently far apart to enable a separa~ 
picture of the men and women to be taken. The juro~j 
remained in their respective immediate presence except fot' 
sleeping purposes. All telephone communications were to, 
-~ 
members of the family of the jury, and there is no evidence, 
that these telephone calls, made in the presence of a bailiff, 
were anything but proper. 
We have given full consideration to the question of, 
the sufficiency of the evidence as supporting the verdict m · 
this case in another part of this opinion dealing with the '" 
motion to direct a verdict, and it seems unnecessary to re-
state what was said there. For the reasons stated in that 
part of this opinion, we hold that the court was fully 
justified in overruling the motion for new trial. 
The record in this case was most extensive and the 
briefs' presented by counsel, although likewise extensive, 
have been of great assistance to this Court in the work of 
resolving the legal questions presented, it being remem-
bered that a reviewing court is not called upon to deter-
mine questions of fact relating to the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant, a function which in the first instance is 
solely within the provincl of the jury. The court in over-
ruling the many assignments of error is unanimously of 
the opinion that the defendant in this case has been 
afforded a fair trial by an impartial jury and in the opinion 
of this Court substantial justice has been done. Sec. 
2945.83 R. C. in part provides: 
"No motion for a new trial shall be granted or verdict 
set aside, nor shall any judgment of conviction be re-
"~rsed in any court because of: * * * 
t 
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(C) The admission or rejection of any evidence 
offered against or for the accused unless it affirma-
tively appears on the record that the accused was or 
may have been prejudiced thereby. 
(D) A misdirection of the jury unless the ac-
cused was or may have been prejudiced thereby. 
(E) Any other cause unless it appears affirma-
tively from the record that the accused was prejudiced 
thereby or was prevented from having a fair trial." 
A careful study of the record and the authority of the 
. foregoing section of the Code of Criminal Procedure re-
t' quires that the judgment be affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. Exceptions noted. 
KoVACHY, J., HURD, J., concur. 
t 
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APPENDIX D. 
Opinion of the Court of Appeals on Appeal from 
Denying New Trial' on the Ground of Newly 
covered Evidence. 
No. 23,551. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, EIGHTH DISTRICT. 
KovACHY, P. J.: 
STATE OF OHIO, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
OPINION. 
July 20, 1955. 
Samuel H. Sheppard was convicted of murder in the ·~ 
-~ 
second degree by a jury in the Common Pleas Court of .J 
Cuyahoga County and sentenced to life imprisonment in : 1 
the Ohio State Penitentiary. He appealed that conviction 
and judgment to this Coutt in State of Ohio vs. Samuel H. 
Sheppard, Case No. 23,400, which judgment has been af- ' 
firmed and opinion filed dealing with the claimed errors 
in that appeal. 
This is a separate appeal emanating from that cause 
on the sole ground that there is error in the record and ' 
proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga .' 
County prejudicial to the rights of the defendant in over- ) 
' 
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g his motion for a new trial on the ground of newly 
iscovered evidence. 
~· 
,~" The motion reads: 
"Now comes the defendant, and moves for a new trial 
on the ground of newly discovered evidence material 
to the defendant, which he could not with reasonable 
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, 
and the defendant further requests that an oral hear-
ing be had on this motion." 
The defendant produced at the hearing on this motion, 
! in support thereof, the affidavits of the witnesses by whom 
: such evidence was expected to be given and the prosecut-
. lng attorney produced affidavits to impeach the affidavits 
: of such witnesses, all in accordance with sub-paragraph F 
~;of Section 2945. 79 of the Revised Code of Ohio. 
''t. There were filed by the defendants: 
Affidavit N. D. E. 1 made by Samuel H. Sheppard. It 
deposes that he is right handed. 
Affidavit N. D. E. 2 made by Arthur E. Petersilge, one 
of counsel for defendant. It sets forth that, on several 
.~occasions during the trial, he sought delivery to the de-
..,_ 
·~ fendant of the keys to the home of the defendant and his 
~murdered wife, and that such request was refused by the 
~office of the County Prosecuting Attorney until December 
,t 23, 1954-two days following the rendition of the verdict 
f by the jury. 
fr~ 
t< Affidavit N. D. E. 3 made by Stephen A. Sheppard, 
.... 
brother cf defendant. It sets forth that he received the 
keys to the defendant's home on December 23, 1954; that 
~ without using them for any purpose, he turned them over 
1· shortly to his brother, Richard N. Sheppard. 
• 
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Affidavit N. D. E. 4 made by Richard N. Shepp. 
brother of defendant. It sets forth that he is Administra' 
of the Estate of the deceased ·Marilyn Sheppard; that he 
ceived the keys from Stephen A. Sheppard on Decem 
23, 1954 and that on January 23, 1955, he made the pr 
ises (scene of the murder) available to Dr. Paul Kirk 
that Dr. Kirk examined the prremises on January 23rd 
24th. Affiant says that there was no change of any kin~ 
made in the interior of the dwelling from the time he reJ 
ceived the keys until after completion of investigation andJ 
examinations within the dwelling by Dr. Kirk. , , 
Affidavit N. D. E. 5 made by Dr. Virgil E. Ha\vs, an~ 
Osteopathic Physician and Pathologist. He states he visitedQ 
" the home (scene of the murder) on February 12th, 1955, 
accompanied by Dr. Richard Sheppard, Dr. Stephen Shep- 1 
pard and Reverend Robert G. Scully, Pastor of the Rocky" 
River Methodist Church. He states that the purpose of the · 
visit was to remove two (2) blood spots from the ward-
robe or closet door on the east wall of the bedroom which 
was the scene of the murder. He described in careful de-
tail how that purpose was accomplished and states that 
the spots were placed in separate bottles and sealed in a .~ 
mailing tube and handed to Reverend Scully, marked Spot 
"A" and Spot "B." 
Affidavit N. D. E. 6 nlade by Reverend Robert G. "'; 
Scully. He corroborates the recital of Dr. Haws as to the 
removal of the blood spots; states the mailing tubes were 
then and there sealed and handed to him; that he mailed 
them to Dr. Paul Kirk, Berkeley, California, on February 
14, 1955. 
Affidavit N. D. E. 7 made by Dr. Paul Leland Kirk, an 
author-· on Criminalistics, who is at present in charge of 
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.e School of Criminology of the University of California. 
:r 
e shall consider its contents later. 
; Affidavit N. D. E. 8 made by William J. Corrigan, one 
.counsel for defendant, in rebuttal to the affidavit made 
__ 'Y Dr. Marsters for the State and received by telephone 
porn Dr. Kirk. It is in reply to Dr. Marsters' affidavit. We 
't~U consider its contents later. 
f There were filed by the State: 
Affidavit N. D. E.-A made by Saul S. Danaceau, 
~~sistant County Prosecuting Attorney. He states that in 
r November 1954, there were discussions touching the sub-
' ject of turning over the keys to the house to Dr. Richard 
A. Sheppard, father-in-law of Marilyn Sheppard, de-
. ceased, and the then Executor of her Estate and that the 
f 
' request was denied. He also states that from the time the 
~ Prosecuting Attorney or his assistants entered into the 
1 case in July 1954 to the present time (April 1955): 
"he does not know of any instance where the defense 
was denied a request to inspect the said home or to 
make any investigation therein." 
Affidavit N. D. E.-B made by Dr. Samuel R. Gerber, 
Coroner of Cuyahoga County. He states that in October 
1954, Fred Garmone, of Counsel for the defendant, visited 
his office and there, in the presence of Thomas Parrino, an 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, inspected a large number 
of articles which were held for evidence and which came 
' from the house in which the deceased was murdered. The 
articles are listed in detail under captions: Bedding from 
bed of victim; Clothing of victim, Marilyn Sheppard; 
Clothing of Dr. Sam Sheppard, in "Hallmark" box. He 
also states that counsel was shown a model of the head of 
' 
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the victim and made notes of his view of said articles 
model. 
Affidavit N. D. E.-C 'made by Leona Phalsgraff 
Raymond Keefe, Secretary and Property Custodian, 1 
spectively, of the Coroner's office. They assert that 
Anthony J. Kazlauckas, a former Deputy Coroner of 
County, visited the Coronet's office in October 1954 an1 
on behalf of the defendant was permitted to examine 
the items which were examined by Mr. Garmone, as 
forth in the Coroner's affidavit, and that Dr. Kazlau 
further examined: 
1 
Autopsy protocol, Case 76629 (M. 7280) Marilyn'. 
Sheppard Conclusions for Laboratory findings. f~ 
X-rays of Marilyn Sheppard, Case 76629 taken" 
,. 
at Coroner's office. ·~ 
Affidavit N. D. E.-D made by Dr. Roger W. Marsters;; 
in charpe of the Maternity Rh Laboratory at the Univer-' 
sity Hospitals in Cleveland (a clinical laboratory). We .. 
shall consider its contents later. 
The bill of exceptions of the trial of the principals 
cause, totaling 7102 pages, a supplemental bill containing 
20G pages and a great number of exhibits in Case No. 23,400 
were also filed in this ap~eal. The facts therein are set~ 
forth in the opinion rendered in that case. These two ap- ~. 
peals have been considered and decided simultaneously. 
The proceedings in the trial court were had under 
authority of Section 2945.79, Revised Code of Ohio, whichli 
reads in part: 
"A new trial after a verdict of conviction may be 
granted upon the application of the defendant for any ( 
81a 
of the following causes affecting materially his sub-
stantial rights: 
A)-
B)-
C)-
D)-
E)-
F)-when new evidence is discovered material 
to the defendant, which he could not with reason-
able diligence have discovered and produced at the 
trial." 
The allowance of the new trial, as set forth in the 
,·Statute above, is bottomed on the proposition that the new 
'.evidence uncovered could not have been discovered and 
1produced at the trial by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence. This is a basic and necessary requirement under 
the law. If it were otherwise, a defendant might well take 
a languorous attitude toward the trial of his case, be in-
dolent in the marshalling of defensive evidence and decide 
to take his chances on the state being unable to prove him 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and even be so bold as to 
hold testimony in his behalf in reserve to be used as 
grounds for another trial in case he be found guilty. 
"A person indicted for a crime and on trial cannot be 
allowed to speculate upon the outcome of his trial and 
to hold back evidence which he may easily procure, 
with the hope and expectation that, should the proof 
against him be more convincing than he anticipates, 
he can put the state to the additional expense of 
another trial, at which the evidence that he has sup-
pressed can be introduced. The law favors a full dis-
covery of all relevant evidence which has a bearing 
upon the criminality of the defendant. It will not per-
mit the accused to mask his batteries, and, havin( 
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thus drawn all the fire of the prosecution, hef~ 
after having been convicted, take the chances 
trial in which everything would be in his fa~:· 
~ 
Underhill's Criminal Evidence, Fourth : 
t,, 
pages 1507 and 1508. 
The Supreme Court in Domanski vs. Woda, l_"' 
208, states the law in paragraphs three and four'"· 
syllabus as follows: ' 
"3. Newly discovered evidence is other 
which might have been known before the te 
of a trial had due diligence been used. 
"4. Where during the trial of a case a partY~~ 
reasonable cause to believe that favorable and~ 
able evidence of a material nature exists, it is his,l 
in the exercise of due diligence, to ask for rl' 
tinuance, if necessary, to investigate, and to p: 
such evidence, if found. Having finally submi 
case without doing so, and having searched f1 
f dund the evidence after verdict, he may not~ 
successfully claim the right to a new trial on the. 
that such evidence is newly discovered." 
See Kroger, Adm. v. Ryan, 83 0. S. 299, 94,_ 
~ 428; c~ 
State v. Brown, 35 0. L. Abs. 77, 39 N. E. (2} 
~-' 
The newly discoveref. evidence claimed by ~ 
fendant in this case was presented to the trial court in· 
'1 
affidavit of Dr. Paul Leland Kirk. The defendant, in eJ 
··~; 
says that his claimed newly discovered evidenc~j 
gathered from the bedroom in which the murder was ·· 
mitted and from exhibits which had been admi 
evidence during the trial and thereafter put in the c· 
of the Prosecuting Attorney, where they were e 
( 
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t;Kirk on his visit here in January, 1955, together 
riments conducted by him in his laboratories at 
:versity of California subsequent thereto. 
'"endant-appellant argues that he was prevented 
linaking this investigation and performing these 
.ents in time for the trial because the state, through 
. uting Attorney of Cuyahoga County and the 
{Of Police of Bay Village, retained possession and 
!i~ of the premises until December 23, 1954, two days 
Pie rendition of the verdict by the jury, when the 
:the home were turned over to the administrator of 
'i;!. 
· -.ered wife's estate and that that was the first time 
.e murder that he was afforded access to the place. 
.e facts with respect to this phase of the case are 
~ 
· Marilyn Sheppard was murdered in the bedroom 
home in the early hours of July 4, 1954. The Chief 
of Bay Village, John F. Eaton, took immediate 
. ion and control of the house and held the keys to 
·· .• late in August when he turned them over to a 
tative of the County Coroner. The Coroner in 
,ve them to the County Prosecuting Attorney. The 
t and members of his family were excluded from 
.e. On a few occasions, however, they were allowed 
, with a police officer in attendance, to remove 
"cles of clothing and other personal possessions. 
lie authorities completed their examination of 
on August 12, 1954. On August 23, the defend-
.de a written request of the Chief of Police for return 
lJteys to his house. This request was refused. Vari-
·" ·er attempts to obtain possession and control of 
1use were later made by counsel for the defendant 
• 
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and the executor of the estate of Marilyn Sheppard-all 
no avail. Around November 3, 1954, the keys were re~ 
turned to Chief Eaton by the Prosecuting Attorney. D~ 
ing the trial the defendant subpoenaed the keys into court:" 
·1 
through Chief Eaton and demanded the right to retahi}: 
them. The trial judge, however, ruled that they must i 
remain in the possession ~f the police of Bay VillageJ, 
which order was carried out until December 23, 1954, ~~ 
when complete possession of the house was given the de-
fendant. There is no evidence that any request to enter ~ 
the house for the purpose of investigation and in~pection 
was ever made by the defendant nor does the record show 
any formal application to the court at any time for a like . 
purpose. Dr. A. J. Kazlauckas, a physician and expert 
who had spent many years as a deputy coroner of Cuya-
hoga County, was in the employ of the defendant. He 
exami1u1d all the articles of property pertaining to this 
case in the possession of the County Coroner, together 
with the autopsy report, conclusions of laboratory findings 
and X-rays of Marilyn Sheppard and yet made no effort to 
make any scientific examination of the premises. He was 
not even presented as a witness during the trial. Assistant 
Prosecuting Attorney, Saul S. Danaceau, deposes in his 
affidavit that he informed 1'rthur E. Petersilge, of counsel 
for the defendant, and the brother of the defendant, Dr. 
Stephen Sheppard, in early November, "that the said 
house was available to the defendant at any and all times 
to inspect or conduct investigations therein." It seems, 
however, that it was understood that on all occasions a 
police officer would have to accompany the defendant or 
any representative of his when visiting the home. 
( 
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Chief of Police, John F. Eaton, testified as follows in 
:respect to this matter on pages 6076, 6077 and 6078 of 
e bill of exceptions: 
"CROSS EXAMINATION OF JOHN EATON 
By Mr. Mahon: 
"Q. Chief, since you have had that key-you got 
it sometime in November, the key to the house, is 
that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. From that time down to date has the house 
been accessible to the Sheppard family? 
A. Yes, it has. 
Q. And have they been in the house during that 
period of time? 
A. Once, on one occasion, at least. 
Q. To take care of the heat, and so forth, and 
water, and all of those things? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have they ever been denied at any time the 
right to go into that house since you had possession of 
the keys? 
A. They have not. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF JOHN EATON. 
By Mr. Corrigan: 
Q. Each time any member of the Sheppard fami-
ly went in the house they had to get your permission? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And each time they went in, they were ac-
companied by a police officer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
4 
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RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF JOHN EATON 
By Mr. Corrigan: 
Q. And the order that Sam Sheppard could nof 
go into his home, where did that come from? 
A. * * * There was no order he could not go in his'. 
home. 
Q. The order that Sam Sheppard could not go ~ 
into his home except in the custody of a policeman·:, 
or with a policeman, how did that originate? 
A. That was suggested, I believe, by the prose-
cutor' s office." 
The burden of proof to show that this require:mrnt of.~· 
the law has been complied with is on the party moving ~ 
for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. ~ 
The Supreme Court of Alabama states it 
Slaughter v. State, 237 Ala. 26; 185 So. 373: 
"An accused who moved for new trial on ground 
of newly discovered evidence has burden of showing 
due diligence." 
The affidavit of Dr. Paul Leland Kirk comprises thir-
ty-three typewritten pages and incorporates by reference 
sixteen supplemental pages, classified as appendixes A to 
J, and forty-six photographs, taken and developed by Dr~ 
Kirk. 
~ . 
In its total aspect, it is a most extraordinary and un- ~ 
usual document when related to the purposes to be served 
by it. The sole purpose of an affidavit offered to support 
a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence is to inform the trial court of the substance of the 
evidence claimed to be newly discovered which will be 
presented at a new trial if one is granted. It is never in-
( 
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~ded as a method to reconsider the evidence introduced 
~at the trial of the case for the purpose of impugning the 
r 
soundness of the verdict brought by the jury. If the courts 
{permitted such practices, the inherent certainty of a trial 
r by jury would soon wane and such function in our system 
; Qf jurisprudence ultimately disintegrate and disappear. 
lYet a major part of Dr. Kirk's affidavit deals with evidence 
presented at the trial and ventures his opinion and con-
' clusion with respect to it together with a criticism of the 
t methods of investigation and technical evidence presented 
:: by the prosecution. This, of course, was entirely beyond 
;,the scope of this instrument and the trial court had the 
indisputable right to totally disregard every particle of it, 
which it did. The affiant states in his affidavit that "no in-
structions or suggestions were made to him as to what to 
find or what not to find by the attorney representing the 
i defendant." We believe that Dr. Kirk could have spared 
~himself much effort and time had he been told by the 
,; attorney for the defendant the narrow scope allo\ved him 
. under the law for further investigation. Certainly much 
{ that is extraneous and redundant might thereby have been 
t. left out of this affidavit. 
The appendixes describe various experiments carried 
~ .. on by Dr. Kirk to supplement and fortify his theories in 
; connection with many elements of this case. All of them 
except one deal with "blood." 
"A" is labeled Blood on Watch Band. In this experi-
ment he daubed an expansible metal watch band liberally 
"' with freshly shed blood in two separate experiments-in 
one, after twenty minutes, the band was dipped in fresh 
water and moved slowly back and forth and in the second, 
• 
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the blood was allowed to dry for one and one quarter ho~ 
and treated similarly. The time required to dissolve tht. 
blood was noted. 
"B" is labeled Time of Drying of Blood. In this experiJJ 
ment the same watch band illustrated in "A" was daubed\ 
Iii 
liberally with fresh blood from a punctured finger. The 'I 
I : 
time of drying on smooth surfaces and in the recesses of , 
the individual bars was noted. Blood also was smeared 
:t 
over the back of the band and the time for drying noted. ·~ 
"C" labeled Blood Trails and gives his opinion as to :~ 
the significance of the blood spots found throughout the ";) 
house, particularly with reference to the steps. 
"D" is labeled Shedding of Blood from Clothing. Ex-
periments were made with five series of cloths, cotton, 
wools, rayon, and silk. These were suspended and liquid 
human blood thrown against them by means of a brush 
dipped' in blood and the time taken when the blood was 
<1pplied and measured until the last drop fell spontaneous-
ly from the garments. 
"E" is labeled Spots from Weapon. Two series of ex-
periments were performed with a variety of objects which 
would illustrate efiects similar to some common weapons. 
They were: 
1. A large bread knife, with a roughly triangular 
blade 8" in length and a breadth at the widest point 
of 11/z". 
2. A large monkey wrench, 15" in length, with 
a jaw 1 %" deep and a maximum opening of 4". 
3. A brass bar, 11 %" in length, %" wide and 
1/s" thick. 
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4. A bar of soft wood, 23" long, 1" wide and 
7 /16" thick. 
5. A small ball pein hammer, with a head length 
of 2112" and a face %" in diameter. 
,-' The first experiments involved dipping these objects 
" in liquid blood, removing them and holding them over 
~paper, recording the time necessary for all blood to drain 
or drop from the object. This was supplemented by a 
similar timing while the object was swinging at a moderate 
,,, 
rate in the hand. 
Then a similar set of experiments was made with ob-
jects 1, 2 and 3 above, in which the dripping weapon was 
carried over long strips of paper at ordinary quick walking 
speeds, and the distance measured to the last drop that 
fell. 
"F" is labeled Transport of Blood by Shoes. This ex-
periment was performed by stepping repeatedly in a re-
gion of heavy blood spots on a floor until the shoe soles 
were thoroughly blood-smeared and then having a per-
son walk normally along a strip of wrapping paper until 
no more blood was visually apparent on the paper. The 
last visible trace of blood was then measured. 
"G" is labeled Blood Removal from Shoes. The ex-
periment consisted of daubing a shoe with leather sole 
and stitching with about two dozen spots of freshly shed 
human blood. Most of it was placed along the stitching 
but various spots were placed at random on the leather of 
the sole. The shoe stood for thirty-five minutes to allow 
complete soaking of the blood into the leather and com-
plete drying. It was then immersed in water and forced 
' 
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back and forth in the water to simulate the wasting ai , 
of water movement for five minutes. The condition of j 
shoe as to blood spots was then noted and any spots t 
r remaining were rubbed vigorously with paper tow 
ii until no actual spots could be seen, this to simulate ,l 
action caused by walking. The shoe thereafter was i 
mersed in fresh water for' five minutes and removed ., .. 
allowed to dry. The tenacity with which blood adb., · 
to such surfaces was thus shown. 
"H" is labeled Amount of Blood Spatter on Clot 
This appendix discloses the spatter of blood oh the ' 
of coveralls worn during the entire series of experime1r 
It also was determinative of any dripping of blood from 
£'~!"~'=~~-
:: ·. =: . =:-: :: • • -=: · - .= · : : ·::: .:: ::·: : ' from - · 
Origins. In this experiment a \Vooden block was 
appr6ximating the hardness of a skull. A layer of · 
- ;(~ rubber 1/s" thick was placed over it, this being abou:"·· 
thickness of the subcutaneous layer of the foreheai -· 
scalp. Then a sheet of polyethylene plastic, to s· · 
the skin, was placed over the sponge rubber. The 
ment so prepared was placed on a stool on wrapping 
to collect blood spatter. ~Around the region was b 
rectangular wall carrying removable paper strips to 
all flying blood on the sides and in front of the sw· 
the object used as a weapon. Paper strips to collect , 
flying upwards were placed over the top. Only on · 
operator's side was the structure open, the operator} 
lecting the blood that traveled backward. The objects 
as weapons included a small ball pein hammer; a "· 
twc4 U flashlight with a flared rim; an inch steel bar~: 
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:'"'.es long; a brass rod 20 inches long, bent at right an-
on the end; a brass bar, % inches in diameter and 2 
long. Blood was puddled on the top of the plastic 
·er and heavy blows were dealt that at least with one 
ect, the plastic sheet and rubber sponge were cut 
bugh to the wood. The paper strips were removed from 
· walls after each series of blows of a certain type and 
ect and photographed. The characteristics of the spat-
blood from impact as well as the throw-off blood on 
· · fore and back strokes were noted from the standpoint 
"J" is labeled Breaking of Teeth. Experiments were 
'.ed on with seven incisor teeth chosen from some 15 to 
· or teeth obtained from dentists who had extracted 
a: To anchor the roots of the teeth solidly as in a jaw, 
i/Y'ere drilled in a heavy brass bar. A hole was filled 
.olten "Woods" metal, an antimony alloy that melts 
,,.ithe boiling point of water, the root was held in the 
"· metal until the alloy was solid and all teeth so 
could not be moved until the metal was remelted. 
.ethod of breaking the teeth varied but usually con-
of pulling steadily on them by means of a hooked 
·cut in a brass bar. Tests were also made attempting 
an unmounted tooth with the bare hands. The 
" of fracture was then studied and compared to the 
fragments found in Marilyn Sheppard's bed. 
. .ese experiments were devised by Dr. Kirk after an 
_ Ction of the Sheppard premises and a view of all the 
''t.· lilts in the hands of the Prosecuting Attorney. There 
··~ason that we can see that would have prevented 
. ·om carrying out the same program before or dur-
'.e trial of this case in the exercise of due diligence. t 
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The affidavits and the evidence at the trial disd 
'!! 
a disposition on the part of both the Chief of Police of ~ 
Village and the Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga Coun~ 
to comply with any reasonable request for such inspectio~ 
of the premises. Moreover it is inconceivable that a forma{ 
application to the Presiding Judge in the Criminal Branch' 
of the Common Pleas Court for the exercise of such right{ 
·•f 
would not have been granted. These experiments conse- · 
':if. 
quently cannot be considered newly discovered evidence. f 
');j 
They could have been prepared for presentation at the trial 
had due diligence and reasonable foresight been exercised J~ 
by the defendant and no grounds for the allowabce of a 1 
new trial exist on this claim. 
In Salinardi v. State, 124 Conn. 670, 2 A (2) 212, the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut had the following to say: 
"To entitle a defendant in a criminal prosecution to a 
new trial for newly discovered evidence, it is indis-
pei1sable that he should have been diligent in his 
efforts fully to prepare his cause for trial, and if the 
new evidence relied upon could have been known 
with reasonable diligence, a new trial will not be 
granted." 
Aside from the question of due diligence, these ex-
periments, in our opinion, could not have been admitted 
in evidence in the trial of this murder case. Experiments, 
to be admissible as evidence, must be performed with iden-
tical or substantially similar equipment and under condi-
tions closely approximating those existing at the time of 
the occurrence being investigated. None of the material 
used for these experiments was the same as that existing 
at the time of the murder. The most important, the head of 
t 
93a 
,:-e victim, was attempted to be simulated by a contraption 
' njured up by Dr. Kirk without any scientific correlation 
the original body whatever. The weapons used were 
selected on the basis of pure speculation. The teeth were 
'not related to those of the deceased for strength or hard-
, ness. Furthermore, the coagulation of blood differs with 
different persons and is affected by the factors-the tern-
, perature and the humidity. The temperature and humidity 
in the bedroom at the time of the murder are unknown and 
! the coagulation time of Marilyn's blood as well as the 
;, blood used in the experiments are unknown. How would it 
be possible under these unknown factors as to both ma-
t terial and conditions to conduct experiments acceptable 
; in a court of law? It must be said that they are interesting 
and no doubt would be of value in a textbook on the sub-
ject but clearly they would have no probative value in the 
trial of this cause. 
The rule is stated in 17 Oh. Juris., Sec. 479, page 587, 
as follows: 
"The general rule is that to render experiments or evi-
dence of experiments made out of court, admissible, 
the conditions need not be identical with those exist-
ing at the time of the occurrence in question; it is 
sufficient if there is substantial similarity. The Ohio 
courts accord with this general rule. But obviously 
the probative value of experiments will depend upon 
the correspondence of the conditions under which 
they are performed to those of the occurrence being 
investigated. If there be an exact correspondence of 
such conditions the experiment will amount to a 
demonstration and be conclusive upon the issue; dis-
similarity of conditions and experiments may affect 
not merely the weight of the evidence, but its admf 
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sibility. * * * If it is utterly impossible to perfo: ··' 
an experiment upon facts and under circu~stan1 ,, 
substantially similar to those in issue, evidence offer, 
. .,,~ 
of an experiment is inadmissible." 
Paragraph seven of the syllabus of Bickley v. Seara, 
Roebuck & Co., 62 Oh. App. 180, (Motion to Certify over:] 
< -~·. 
ruled by the Supreme Court), states: ·
1
1 
"7. Evidence as to the result of experiments made 
by a party after an accident, to be admissible, must ' 
show the facts surrounding the experiments were· 
substantially the same as they were at the time of the 
accident." I 
Paragraph one of the syllabus of State v. Farrell, 64 ' 
0. L. Abs. 481 (Court of Appeals, Eighth District, Motion·, 
to Certify overruled) reads: f 
"1. It is not necessary, in order to render experi- .~ 
mcnts or evidence of experiments made out of court ~ 
admissible, that the conditions be identical with the l 
conditions existing at the time of the occurrence in 
question; it is sufficient if there be substantial simi- .~ 
larity; however, the probative value of such experi- 1 
ments depends upon the correspondence of the con- .i 
ditions under which they are performed to those of 
the occurrence under investigation." 
Dr. Kirk, in his affidkvit, under the title Technical 
Evidence of the Prosecutor discusses Water under defend-
ant's wrist watch Crystal; Loss of T-Shirt; The claimed 
drying of blood on Mrs. Sheppard's wrist before her watch 
was - Jved; and Drying of blood on defendant's watch 
vas inserted in the green bag. 
· the title Blood Trails, he discusses Clothing; 
' '.in of hands (or face, etc.) ; and Shoes and then 
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(discusses Green Bag and Contents; and Blood on Defend-
,. 4nt' s Clothing. His opinion as to each of the indicated sub-
jects is based upon experiments described in Appendixes 
A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H. They amount to mere criticism 
of the manner in which the prosecution's evidence was 
gathered, doubt as to its evidence having any bearing at all 
on the guilt or innocence of the defendant and his personal 
opinion as to its significance. In no sense can this be in-
terpreted as newly discovered evidence. 
The next division in the affidavit is entitled, The Mur-
,. der Scene, and the main discussion comes under the head-
ing Blood Distribution. He here describes the distribution 
of blood on the walls, defendant's bed and the radiator. 
By determining the point of origin, he gives the opinion 
that the head of the victim was essentially in the same po-
sition during all of the blows from which blood was spat-
tered on the defendant's bed; that her head was on the 
sheet during most, if not all of the beating that led to the 
blood spots; that probably all of the blood drops on the 
east wall were thrown there by the back swing of the 
weapon used; that the blows on the victim's head came 
from swings of the weapon "which started low in a left 
hand swing, rising through an arc, and striking the victim 
a sidewise angular blow rather than one brought down-
ward vertically." He then explains the Cause of Distribu-
tion and comes to the conclusion based on his experiments 
as described in Appendix I and his observation of the 
blood distribution in the bedroom that the blows were 
struck by a left-handed person. He then proceeds to ex-
plain the impact spatter, and the throw-off drops of certain 
• 
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weapons and decides that the blood spots on the doors 
the bedroom were drops made by the back-throw oft 
lethal weapon, and that a very large spot on the wardro 
door could not have come from the back-throw of th 
weapon. This spot measured about one inch in diamet~ 
He then expostulates that "this spot could not have com 
from impact spatte~. It is highly improbable that it couM 
•• 
have been thrown off a weapon" and that "it almost cer. 
tainly came from a bleeding hand.-The bleeding hanO 
could only have belonged to the attacker." 
We read this portion of Dr. Kirk's affidiivit with much 
interest for it displayed high qualities of originality and 
imagination, blended with a wide range of knowledge of 
the subject discussed. However, none of it is newly dis· 
covered evidence as contemplated by the law and has no 
juridical value in this case because: 
( 1) it includes matter that could have been 
offered at the trial had due diligence been exercised; 
(2) most of the facts involved had been given to the jury at the trial; 
( 3) the conclusion that the assailant was a left. 
handed person was argued to the jury at the trial and 
besides was not a subject for opinion evidence since 
it was a conclusion for the jury alone to draw in the 
exercise of its colnmon sense and ordinary knowl-
edge from the facts and circumstances as shown by the evidence; 
( 4) the opinion that the large spot could not 
have come from the murder weapon was guesswork 
since the weapon itself is unknown; 
( 5) the statement that the large blood spot came 
from the bleeding hand of the assailant is sheer suP-position; 
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(6) the impossibility of performing experiments 
to approximate the facts and circumstances of the oc-
currence involved. 
17 Oh. Juris., Sec. 479, p. 588 reads: 
"If it is utterly impossible to perform an experi-
ment upon facts and under circumstances substan-
tially similar to those in issue, evidence offered of an 
experiment is inadmissible." 
In paragraph four of the syllabus of Ohio Power Co. 
v. Fittro, Admx., 36 Oh. App. 186, it is stated: 
"4. In action for death by electrocution, demon-
strative evidence to show distance voltage would 
jump from wire held properly excluded, in view of 
impossibility of performing experiment on facts in 
. " issue. 
Also 17 Oh. Juris., Sec. 324, page 415 reads: 
"Jurors are supposed to be competent in everything 
pertaining to the ordinary and common knowledge of 
mankind, and to be peculiarly qualified to determine 
the connection between cause and effect established 
by common experience, and to draw the proper con-
clusions from the facts before them." 
The syllabus of Perkins v. State, 5 0. C. C. 597 states: 
"Upon the trial of a case, where the accused is charged 
with murder in the second degree, physicians having 
been called on behalf of the state, who testified that 
they attended the post mortem examination, giving 
a full description of the wounds found upon the head 
of the deceased, their location, and that they were 
sufficient to produce death, it is error to permit such 
witnesses to give testimony against the objection of 
the accused as to the probable relative position of the 
parties at the time the fatal blow was struck; such 
' 
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testimony is the mere opinion of the witnesses b 
upon the facts proven, and from which the jury is 
capable of drawing proper inference as the witnesses. 
The wounds on Marilyn Sheppard's face and hea1" 
show a vicious attack with great force directed to vi 
spots. Because of their character, number and locatio 
the jury may well have conc1uded that the wielder of the 
weapon, being impelled by consuming rages and sudden·~ 
animosity, had a definite purpose to kill and further that{' 
a person so motivated would strike from any direction l 
necessary to accomplish his purpose. 
1 In view of these circumstances, the deductions of Dr. 
Kirk that the pattern of blood spatter, the position and ;'. 
.-fl direction of the victim's head and the assumed position of ~'~ 
the assailant is only consistent with the hypothesis that the 
murderer was a left-handed person is, in our opinion,• 
highly SP,eculative and fallacious. I 
The next division of Dr. Kirk's affidavit is titled Blood 
Groups and Individuality. He states that the grouping of 
the large spot of blood found on the wardrobe door was 
performed simultaneously with the same sera and cells 
and in identical manner as the known blood of Marilyn 
Sheppard removed from tae mattress and the second 
large spot (%"in diameter) removed from the wardrobe. 
The latter was used for a control test and dissolved readily 
in distilled water and gave no sign of delayed agglutina-
tion, as was true of the known blood of the victim, but the 
large spot "was definitely less soluble than that from the 
smaller spot, or from controls from the mattress" and "in 
nning the agglutination tests, in every instance and with 
' 
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• ,ts for both A and B factors, agglutination was much 
ower and less certain than the controls. The fact that 
!elayed agglutination occurred indicated clearly that this 
ilood was also 0 group, but its behavior was so dif-
r.· 
,ferent as to be striking. These differences are considered 
" 
''to constitute confirmatory evidence that the blood of the 
_large spot had a different individual origin from most of 
':the blood in the bedroom." 
The balance of Dr. Kirk's affidavit deals with Tooth 
'Fragments, Blood-stained Bedding. The Weapon and Mis-
cellaneous Items 1) Victim's Slacks; 2) Top sheet of 
·;Victim's bed; 3) Pillows; 4) Nail Polish Fragments and 
5) Leather Fragment. All of these matters were covered 
in detail in the trial of the case and under no circum-
.t stances can be called newly discovered evidence. Never-
theless, he undertakes to state his own ideas concerning 
~. them and advances his personal theories as to their sig-
nificance in the case. We know of no rule of law per-
mitting a re-evaluation of a decided case by a person 
versed in criminalistics with the purpose in mind of laying 
the groundwork for a new trial. 
, The final subject of the affidavit is styled-Recon-
f struction with the sub-title-Defendant's Account. In this 
discussion, the affiant gives his own version of the murder 
• from the standpoint of his interpretation of the physical 
facts and then adroitly fits in the defendant's story to con-
form to the same. It is inconceivable that such testimony 
could be given to a jury at a retrial of this cause. It would 
be usurping the function of the jury. 
4 
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The Supreme Court in Fowler v. Delaplain, 79 0. 8'J 
279, paragraph one of the syllabus, says: .~ 
;··1 
"A question to a witness which calls for his opinion on 
the precise issue of fact which the jury is sworn tQ. 
determine from the evidence, is incompetent." 
Also, Protection Ins. Co. v. Harmer, 2 0. S. 452, para-
graph three of the syllabus: 
"Opinions are only admissible, where the nature 
of the inquiry involves a question of science or art, or 
of professional or mechanical skill, and then only 
from witnesses skilled in the particular business to 
which the question relates." I 
Dr. Kirk's opinion as to the large blood spot, dis-
cussed above, requires further consideration on our part. 
Dr. Roger W. Marsters, a recognized authority on 
blood, deals entirely with this claim of Dr. Kirk's in his 
affidavit. He states that "Under ideal conditions * * * 
variability occurs in the routine performance of blood 
grouping '1' * *. These variables are almost always quanti-
tative differences rather than qualitative ones. * * * 
Dr. Kirk is postulating difierent qualities of type 0 
blood char:lctcristic. Even under ideal conditions of fresh 
blood reactions, sub-groups of type 0 are unknown. 
Therefore, to assume the exis\ence of another quality of 
type 0 and especially another individual source on the 
basis of some quantitative difference in reaction and 
solubility employing an admittedly complex technique 
cannot be justified." 
Dr. Kirk in his rebuttal affidavit questions the quali-
fications of Dr. Marsters in absorption grouping of dried 
( 
lOla 
He admits "differences in regular blood grouping 
do occur * * * ," and that "much greater differences occur 
in grouping dried blood because of variation in the con-
ditions under which blood is stored, admixture with 
foreign substances * * * ," but says "these conditions * * * 
,'do not apply to the present case." He further says that 
'f variations in behavior of different types of blood are due 
to minor variations in technique or conditions and that 
these are extremely small when run by experienced per-
sons, that samples of blood of two different persons, even 
· though of the same group * * * will often behave differ-
ently; and that any variation in them of a magnitude 
greater than small experimental variation, when treated 
identically, must be significant. 
f 
He claims that the two spots in this case "were de-
posited on the same paint, on the same panel of the same 
door and close together." They appeared normal, were 
free of contaminating substances and that there was "no in-
dication of any accidental or uncontrolled variation be-
tween the two spots that could account for the differences 
claimed.'' 
He says "No postulate was made by me of different 
qualities of Type 0 blood characteristic, nor of any hypo-
thetical 'sub-groups.' Rather the claim concerns differ-
ent qualities of blood, both of which happen to be of 
Type O," and cites Lattes "Individuality of the Blood" as 
authority "that wide differences do occur in Group 0 
bloods." 
He further states: 
"7. Solubility differences claimed do not rest on 
different times necessary to dissolve difference size of 
t 
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re-dissolved; this is a very delicate process and ma)'j 
readily lead to serious errors." ' 
On page 271 he states:' 
"These quantitative differences cannot easily be util-\ 
ized in forensic cases relating to blood-stains, for the ~J 
blood in these has invariably undergone changes due " 
to age or other deleterious circumstances, which \ 
attenuate the agglutinins." 
On page 272 he states: 
"These sub-groups would appear to be fairly constant, 
though, since we have to deal with quantitative dif-
ferences (Thomsen), the possibility of differentiating 
between them for forensic purposes would seem to be 
likely to remain somewhat uncertain. 
The differentiation between individuals belong-
ing to Group 0, which Landsteiner and Levine claim 
to have accomplished by means of human iso-agglu..: 
tinating sera is still more problematical." 
I 
On page 292 he states: 
"Further, in investigations where we have to start 
from dried blood, particularly in forensic cases, the 
methods suggested by a number of writers, as we saw 
on page 268, do not prevent the occurrence of mis-
takes, and might even be said to favour them." 
Dr. Kirk seems to beli~re that the fact that the large 
spot dissolved more slowly and that the agglutination tests 
appeared more slowly is "confirmatory evidence" that this 
spot originated from a different individual. Such dif-
ference in reaction is quantitative only. It, under no cir-
cumstances, denotes a qualitative difference. The weight 
of the expert opinion seems to be that such differences 
may he attributable to factors of contamination. It must 
( 
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be remembered that this large blood spot was on the ward-
robe door some eight months during changes of tempera-
ture, humidity, and in a room that had had many persons 
milling about, doing various chores, and conducting many 
't 
r tests. Moreover, it was scraped from a door covered with 
coats of paint. How much of this paint was removed at 
: the time of scraping no one knows. The test is a delicate 
,. one involving small quantities of material. A large drop 
of blood, too, would take longer to dry. What bacterial or 
chemical contamination befell it is not known. Finger-
print dusting powder, ultra-violet light, dust, detergent 
deposit, perspiration or body oils of human origin were 
present in the room. Dr. Kirk himself in his book on 
"Crime Investigation" says on pages 198 and 199: 
"O blood which contains neither A or B agglutinogen 
contains both agglutinins, * * *" 
and on pages 199 and 200, he says: 
"It is also clear that variations of considerable magni-
tude in the strength of reaction exists between per-
sons classed in the same group. For this reason, there 
are various subclassifications such as Ai and A2 in 
use among serologists. The distinction between these 
rests chiefly on the strength of reaction and can be 
obtained satisfactorily only when fresh blood is avail-
able. With dried blood stains, the form in which most 
blood appears in evidence, it is not simple to deter-
mine the subgroups with certainty." 
and on page 201: 
"It should be noted further that, on standing, the ag-
glutinins are slowly lost in many bloods. For this 
reason, a test which depends only on testing for ag-
glutinin is to be trusted completely only when the 
' 
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blood is comparatively fresh, or when the results 
checked also by methods testing for the presence 
agglutinogen as well.'" 
From a careful consideration of the affidavits on tbli; 
subject, as well as the authorities referred to above, w~i 
find: 
(1) that Dr. Kirk's contention rests on the dif-
ference in time in the appearance of agglutination of 
the large spot when compared to the same reaction of 
known blood of Marilyn and the smaller spot used as 
a control; 
1 (2) that Dr. Kirk believes that this difference 
confirms the presence of a person at the murder scene 
other than the victim and the defendant; 
(3) that experts contra say that such differences 
are not unusual even with known samples of the same 
blood and at most is a quantitative and not a qualita-
tive difference; 
( 4) that all three blood samples were of the same 
blood Group, known as 0; 
( 5) that the samples tested, being dried blood 
exposed for some eight months in a room subjected 
to much activities by many persons, who examined 
and tested various parts of the room, were exposed to 
contamination of ma~F sorts: bacteria, fingerprint 
dusting powder, hand or body oils and perspiration, 
dust and other substances; 
(6) that in the removal of the stain from the 
wardrobe door, paint, soap and detergents may have 
been scraped off; 
(7) that experts agree that tests conducted on 
dried blood are not as reliable as those made on fresh 
blood; 
( 
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(8) and that no court, to our knowledge, has ac-
cepted such findings as proof of blood from different 
persons. 
We conclude from all the foregoing that the opinion of 
1 Dr. Kirk that "These differences are considered to con-
stitute confirming evidence that the blood of the large spot 
had a different individual origin from most of the blood in 
the bedroom," even though such blood had the same blood 
grouping as that of Marilyn Sheppard's, is based on claims 
so theoretical and speculative in view of Dr. Marsters' 
affidavit, the statements of authority referred to by Dr. 
Kirk and his own writings on the subject as to have no 
probative value in support of defendant's claim of newly 
discovered evidence. 
A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence is directed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court. 
The Supreme Court in Taylor v. Ross, 150 0. S. 448, 
in paragraph two of the syllabus, states: 
"2. The granting or refusing of a new trial on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence rests largely 
within the sound discretion of the trial court; and 
when such discretion has not been abused, reviewing 
courts should not interfere. (Paragraph two of the 
syllabus in the case of Domanski v. Woda, 132 0. S. 
208, approved and followed.)" 
See: 
26 0. S. 1, Smith & Wallace v. Bailey; 
96 0. S. 410, State v. Lopa; 
124 0. S. 29, 32, Canton Stamping v. Eles; 
132 0. S. 208, Domanski v. Woda; 
148 0. S. 505, State v. Petro; 
• 
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51 0. L. Abs. 185, State v. Tarrant; 
13 0. L. Abs. 244, Pannell v. State; 
2R 0. L. Abs. 166, Cebulek v. Tisone. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion m 
regard. 
Paragraph three of the syllabus of The People v. Fice, 
I 
97 Cal. 459 reads as follows: 
"It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
deny a motion for a new trial in a criminal prosecu-
tion, made upon the ground of newly discovered evi-
dence, where the affidavits offered in support the1eof 
are fully contradicted by counter-affidavits on the part 
of the prosecution." 
It is the law with respect to a motion of this kind that 
a new trial will not be granted on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence unless the affidavits in support thereof 
contain statements which, if it had been offered in evidence 
I 
at the trial, would have required the jury to return a dif-
ferent verdict. 
The Supreme Court in Cleveland, Columbus, Cincin-
nati & Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Long, 24 0. S. 133, says: 
"A new trial should not be granted on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence, unless the legitimate effect 
of such evidence, when co~idered in connection with 
that produced on the trial, ought to have resulted in a 
diflerent verdict or finding. The rule of practice, on 
this subject, was not substantially changed by Section 
297 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 
See: 
7 0. L. Abs. 583, Cleveland Ry. v. Leanza; 
4 0. L. Abs. 53, Licate v. State; 
t 
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7 0. L. Abs. 711, DeSantis v. Brumbaugh; 
12 0. L. Abs. 173, Martin v. State. 
The trial court in its written opinion on this question 
said: 
"It is not reasonable to believe that production of the 
testimony of Dr. Kirk at the trial, and the counter-
testimony of Dr. Marsters, would have made the 
slightest difference in the total evidence, and cer-
tainly not resulted in a different conclusion by the 
jury." 
" We believe the trial court was in the best position to deter-
mine that question. 
Having read the voluminous evidence of the murder 
trial, studied in detail the affidavits filed in support of and 
contra to the motion, and the briefs of counsel, and having 
come to the several conclusions stated above, we unani-
mously hold that the trial court did not commit prejudicial 
error nor abuse its discretion in overruling the motion for 
a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. 
t 
Judgment affirmed. Exceptions. Order see journal. 
SKEEL, J., HURD, J., concur. 
f 
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APPENDIX E. 
Judgment of Court of Appeals Affirming Judgment,; 
on Verdict. 
July 20th, 1955: 
Appeal by Sam H. Sheppard, 
(Law). 
This cause came on to be heard on the appeal on 
questions of law from the judgment of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas and was argued by counsel for the parties; and·. 
upon consideration of all of the errors assigned, the Court , 
finds no error prejudicial to the appellant and therefore t 
the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this 
Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this 
judgment into execution. Appellant excepts. /s/ Julius 
M. Kovachy, Presiding Judge. 
Received for filing July 20, 1955. Leonard F. Fuerst, 
Clerk of Courts. By A. M. Harrington, Deputy. (Jr. 20, 
pg. 201.) 
t 
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APPENDIX F. 
'udgment of Court of Appeals Affirming Order Denying 
New Trial on the Ground of Newly Discovered Evidence. 
.July 25, 1955: 
Appeal by Samuel H. Sheppard, Defendant-Appellant 
, (Law). 
This cause came on to be heard on the appeal on 
questions of law from the judgment of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, overruling the 
·motion of appellant for a new trial on the ground of newly 
.. discovered evidence, and was argued by counsel for the 
parties; and upon consideration of all of the errors assigned, 
the Court finds no error prejudicial to the appellant nor 
any abuse of discretion, and therefore the judgment of the 
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant excepts. 
(Jr. 20, page 203.) 
• 
